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IRAQ AND THE FUTURE OF UNITED STATES 
FOREIGN POLICY: FAILURES OF LEGITIMACY 
Henry H. Perritt, Jr.• 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Recently, I published a law review article, "Structures and 
Standards for Political Trusteeships," which sought to draw lessons 
from international interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timar, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq. 1 The article offered a number of "prescriptions" 
for success in such "political trusteeships. "2 Enough time has passed, 
since the United States attacked Iraq seeking "regime change," to permit 
a focused assessment of the Iraq venture according to the prescriptions 
offered in the earlier article. This article evaluates the political 
trusteeship in Iraq, and concludes that the United States failed to apply 
many lessons that the international community learned from preceding 
political trusteeships, and that the result is likely to be a serious 
unraveling of important, though intangible, sources of leverage for U. S. 
foreign policy and national security. 
It would be a mistake, however, to overlook the positive aspects of 
the Bush Administration's Iraq intervention. On the whole, the 
Administration did poorly in seeking and creating international 
legitimacy for its political trusteeship, but it belatedly embraced some of 
the prescriptions for building internal legitimacy by seeking to establish 
the foundation for a liberal democracy and perceiving the need for an 
exit strategy. The political trusteeship in Iraq has recognized the need 
to build political structures for managing internal conflict. It has sought 
to avoid democratic elections before the mediating institutions of a 
liberal democracy had sprouted. It has been deliberate in its effort to 
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1. Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Structures and Standards for Political Trusteeship, 8 U.C.L.A. 
J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 385 (2003) [hereinafter "Political Trusteeship"]; A "political 
trusteeship" is the exercise of sovereignty over a territory by international organizations or 
foreign powers for a limited time, for the benefit of the peoples of the territory, aimed at 
creating the capacity for self-government. It resembles the exercise of "mandatory" power 
under the League of Nations Mandate System and the exercise of "Trust" power under the 
United Nations Trusteeship System, but occurs outside those general treaty frameworks. It 
can be distinguished from more limited forms of international intervention such as 
peacekeeping. Id. 
2. Id. 
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identify appropriate local and external elites. Despite these indicia of 
sophistication, the Bush Administration's Iraq policies have achieved 
modest results at best, and have been applied inconsistently. Often the 
implementation of the prescriptions was flawed and naive, or driven by 
ideology or cronyism. 
Abandoning a foolish early myth that the occupation army would 
be uniformly embraced, the Administration came to recognize, by late 
October of 2003, that intolerance for the occupying forces was high and 
building. Any sound exit strategy had to result in a turnover of 
governmental power before legitimacy of the trustee broke down 
completely. Working under this time pressure, the Administration 
formulated reasonably coherent concepts for evolving the initial Interim 
Authority into a more effective and more representative Iraqi interim 
government, while exploring a variety of ways in which to improve 
representation. At the same time, the Administration deferred popular 
elections until more progress was made on erecting mediating 
institutions. 
The Bush Administration consciously was willing to pay the price 
of reduced international legitimacy in order to have greater control over 
a political trusteeship aimed at establishing internal legitimacy, building 
the institutions of a liberal democracy, and defining for itself an 
appropriate exit strategy.3 Whether the results prove worth the price 
depends on how competently the U.S. exercises this control. So far, 
internal legitimacy is impaired by U.S. dominance of the political 
trusteeship. The institutions of liberal democracy are emerging slowly, 
if at all, amidst chaos and violence, and no coherent exit strategy, 
linked to concrete progress in building local capacity, is apparent. 
The impact on American foreign policy depends in part on whether 
the Iraq intervention is successful. If it is, the United States will send a 
powerful signal that its new National Security Strategy is viable, at least 
in the short run, and the dynamics of international relations will reflect 
reactions to that doctrine.4 An unsuccessful intervention, however, will 
undermine the credibility of the National Security Strategy and, with it, 
the credibility of American power. The lack of any post-war planning 
led to chaos, which undermined the international and internal legitimacy 
of the trustee. "Success" as originally defined by the Bush 
Administration is hard to imagine at this juncture-just after the handoff 
of sovereignty to an un-elected Interim Government. 
3. See infra Part 11.C; see infra Part II.D; see infra Part ILE. 
4. See infra Part IIl.B. 
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In either event, this article argues that the Iraq intervention has 
distracted attention from more important foreign policy objectives, 
including the urgent effort to understand the genesis of terrorism and to 
mobilize American resources to reduce the terrorist threat, while 
working through multilateral frameworks. Accomplishment of these is 
necessary for achieving important foreign policy goals. 
II. MEASURING THE IRAQ INTERVENTION AGAINST THE PRESCRIPTIONS 
FOR SUCCESSFUL POLITICAL TRUSTEESHIP 
The experiences in Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq, combined with the history of earlier international interventions, 
teach that political trusteeships succeed when they are defined clearly to 
include the basic attributes of sovereignty: when they enjoy 
international legitimacy, when they attain an explicit goal to build 
liberal democracy, and when they are shaped by a coherent and realistic 
exit strategy to hand-off power to local institutions as their capacity 
increases.5 The U.S.-led Iraq intervention is deficient in differing 
degrees on most of these measures. On the whole, the Administration 
did poorly in seeking and gaining international legitimacy for its 
political trusteeship in Iraq and stumbled badly in following the 
prescriptions for building internal legitimacy. While the U.S. civilian 
administration of Iraq apparently perceived the need for establishing the 
foundation for a liberal democracy, and perceiving the need for an exit 
strategy, the lack of serious planning and ignorance of Iraqi political 
dynamics made these goals more rhetorical than realistic. At best, the 
Bush Iraq policies may be faulted for achieving modest results and 
showing every sign of being stampeded into a premature exit. 
A. Failure to De.fine the Trusteeship Clearly. 
1. Clearly De.fine Where Sovereignty Resides 
Political Trusteeship argues that effective political trusteeship 
requires a clear legal framework investing temporary sovereignty in the 
trustee.6 The legal framework for Iraq is ambiguous in important 
respects. The United States government has insisted on unilateral 
authority to make major decisions with respect to civil administration 
and the development of Iraqi institutions but has failed to explain how it 
exercises this authority through formal legal.texts.7 The United Nations 
5. See Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 472. 
6. See generally id. 
7. See generally notes 17-21 infra and accompanying text. 
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has declared that sovereignty reposes in indigenous organizations, while 
recognizing interim authority of the occupying powers under 
international law, providing no real detail as to how this joint exercise 
of sovereignty is supposed to work or to evolve. 
On May 22, 2003, after U.S. and British forces militarily subdued 
resistance in Iraq, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1483 
("SCR 1483").8 The Resolution recognized the role of the U.S. and 
Great Britain as occupying powers, while also embracing Iraq's self-
determination. 9 
The Resolution left no doubt that the occupying authorities were to play 
the role of political trustees: 
It "[ c ]alls upon the Authority, consistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations and other relevant international law, to promote the 
welfare of the Iraqi people through the effective administration of the 
territory, including in particular working towards the restoration of 
conditions of security and stability and the creation of conditions in 
which the Iraqi people can freely determine their own political 
future." 10 
The Resolution "[ s ]upports the formation, by the people of Iraq with 
the help of the Authority and working with the Special Representative, 
of an Iraqi interim administration as a transitional administration run 
by Iraqis, until an internationally recognized, representative 
government is established by the people of Iraq and assumes the 
responsibilities of the Authority." 11 
The Resolution also authorized the Secretary General to appoint a 
"Special Representative" to coordinate U.N. international-agency and 
Authority activities in Iraq, and to support development of local 
governmental institutions. 12 
8. U.N. S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4176th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 
(2003) [hereinafter Security Council Resolution 1483 or SCR 1483]. 
9. "Noting the letter of 8 May 2003 from the Permanent Representatives of the United 
States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the 
President of the Security Council (S/2003/538) and recognizing the specific authorities, 
responsibilities, and obligations under applicable international law of these states as 
occupying powers under unified command (the "Authority") .. . "Id. Pmbl. "Stressing the 
right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their own political future and control their own 
natural resources, welcoming the commitment of all parties concerned to support the 
creation of an environment in which they may do so as soon as possible, and expressing 
resolve that the day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly ... " Id. 
10. Id.~ 4. 
11. Id.~ 9. 
12. "[W]orking intensively with the Authority, the people oflraq, and others concerned 
to advance efforts to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative 
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In October of 2003, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1510, 
declaring that Iraqi sovereignty resides in Iraqi institutions, and urging 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (the civil administration established 
by the occupying powers) to devolve power to local institutions as soon 
as practicable. 13 The Resolution provided for a strengthened United 
Nations role in supporting local institutions, however, without, 
suggesting any U.N. power to make governmental decisions. 14 Under 
the Resolution, the local institutions are responsible for designing and 
implementing processes to write a constitution and hold national 
elections, with U.N. support. 15 
governance, including by working together to facilitate a process leading to an 
internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq ... " SCR 1483, supra note 8, 
~ 8(c). The U.N. Special Representative also is charged with: "promoting economic 
reconstruction and the conditions for sustainable development." Id. ~ 8(e) The Special 
Representative is also charged with "encouraging international efforts to contribute to basic 
civilian administration functions, promoting the protection of human rights, encouraging 
international efforts to rebuild the capacity of the Iraqi civilian police force, and 
encouraging international efforts to promote legal and judicial reform". Id. ~ 8(f)-(i). 
13 . U.N. S.C. Res. 1511, 58th Sess., 4844th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/1511 (2003) 
[hereinafter Security Council Resolution 1511 or SCR 1511 ]. "[T]the sovereignty of Iraq 
resides in the State of Iraq, reaffirming the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their 
own political future and control their own natural resources, reiterating its resolve that the 
day when Iraqis govern themselves must come quickly ... " Id. Pmbl. The Resolution 
"Determines that the Governing Council and its ministers are the principal bodies of the 
Iraqi interim administration, which, without prejudice to its further evolution, embodies the 
sovereignty of the State of Iraq during the transitional period until an internationally 
recognized, representative government is established and assumes the responsibilities of the 
Authority." Id.~ 4. The resolution "underscores .. . the temporary nature of the exercise by 
the Coalition Provisional Authority (Authority) of the specific responsibilities, authorities, 
and obligations under applicable international law recognized and set forth in resolution 
1483 ... which will cease when an internationally recognized, representative government 
established by the people of Iraq is sworn in and assumes the responsibilities of the 
Authority." Id. ~ 1. It "calls upon the Authority ... to return governing responsibilities and 
authorities to the people of Iraq as soon as practicable and requests the Authority, in 
cooperation as appropriate with the Governing Council and the Secretary-General, to report 
to the Council on the progress being made." Id.~ 6. 
14. "[T]he United Nations, acting through the Secretary-General, his Special 
Representative, and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Iraq, should strengthen its 
vital role in Iraq, including by providing humanitarian relief, promoting the economic 
reconstruction of and conditions for sustainable development in Iraq, and advancing efforts 
to restore and establish national and local institutions for representative government. .. " 
SCR 1511, supra note 13, ~ 8. 
15. The Resolution "[t]akes note of the intention of the Governing Council to hold a 
constitutional conference and, recognizing that the convening of the conference will be a 
milestone in the movement to the full exercise of sovereignty, calls for its preparation 
through national dialogue and consensus-building as soon as practicable and requests the 
Special Representative of the Secretary-General, at the time of the convening of the 
conference or, as circumstances permit, to lend the unique expertise of the United Nations to 
the Iraqi people in this process of political transition, including the establishment of 
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This framework left the political trustee's scope of decision-
making responsibility unclear. The U.N. legal framework established a 
political trusteeship by declaring the duty to develop eventual self-
governance and to govern for the benefit of the Iraqi people. The U.N. 
left the allocation of governing power between international and local 
institutions vague. It thus resembled Bosnia, except that in Bosnia the 
local institutions existed and had been recognized as sovereign before 
international intervention. It was far less focused than the resolutions 
defining the political trusteeships in Kosovo and East Timor, which left 
no question that the U.N. was to serve as political trustee. 16 
The legal framework for the United States' role through its 
Coalition Provisional Authority ("CPA") also was ambiguous under 
U.S. law. The Administrator of the CPA, in his Regulation No. 1, 
determined, "the CPA shall exercise the powers of government 
temporarily in order to provide for the effective administration of Iraq 
during the period of transitional administration ... " 17 It declared, "[t]he 
CPA is vested with all executive, legislative and judicial authority 
necessary to achieve its objectives, to be exercised under relevant U.N. 
Security Council resolutions ... and the laws and usages of war."18 The 
CPA thus asserted sovereign powers, yet the source of these powers is 
unclear. 
Congressional oversight of the CPA implied that some attributes of 
sovereignty remained with the United States, but the President issued no 
executive order establishing the CPA, and no statute defined it or even 
explicitly referred to it, except for the Iraq Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriation Act. 19 It is unclear whether the Administrator of the CPA 
reported directly to the President or to the Secretary of Defense.20 The 
electoral processes ... " SCR 1511, supra note 13, ~ 10. 
16. See Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 401-404. 
17. Coalitional Provisional Authority [hereinafter CPA], § 1, ~ 1 (2003), available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CP AREG_l_ The_ Coalition_Provisiona 
l_Authority_.pdf. (last visited June 25, 2004). 
18. Id.~ 2. 
19. Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the 
Reconstruction oflraq and Afghanistan, H.R. 3289, 108th Cong. OS1 Sess. 2003) [hereinafter 
Iraq Emergency Supplemental Appropriation]. An appropriations rider requires the Director 
of OMB, in consultation with the Administrator of the CPA to report to the Congress on the 
uses of appropriated funds on a project-by-project basis. Id. § 2207(a). The Act 
appropriates funds to the President for the "Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq (in its 
capacity as an entity of the United States Government) ... " Id. The Act extends certain of 
its requirements to "any successor United States Government entity with the same or 
substantially the same authorities and responsibilities as the Coalition Provisional Authority 
in Iraq." Id. § 2208. 
20. "The president made a decision to start it out with Jerry Bremer reporting to me. 
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duties of the CPA were similarly vague, except for a few appropriation-
act requirements which are bizarre in their particularity, singling out 
opportunities for the disabled and women, and ending religious 
discrimination as mandates for the CPA, but not otherwise addressing 
political trustee obligations.21 The CPA established the Interim Iraqi 
Governing Council, which was meant to exercise indigenous authority. 
But its power was contingent on CPA approval, and it owed its 
existence entirely to the decrees of the CPA. 
While the United States apparently sought to reduce ambiguity in 
defining the political trusteeship in Iraq by insisting on unilateral 
authority, the result was a muddle, in terms of who was responsible for 
what, and in terms of how the trusteeship was to evolve. Within this 
vague legal framework, de-facto exercise of political power by three 
independent authorities-the U.N., the U.S.-created CPA, and the CPA-
created !GA-inevitably led to confusion and conflict. 
When sovereignty was formally transferred to the Interim 
Government on June 28, 2004, the formal legal documents were less 
ambiguous than those that had preceded them. A "Law of 
The implication in the press was that he was going to report to the White House or Condi 
Rice. As Condi has indicated, that was not the import of the memo, that's not what the 
memo said, that's not what was intended. We know that that activity, as it matures, will 
migrate over at the Department of State. I mean, that's how-where ambassadors report. 
And eventually, it will arrive there at some point. And that would be a decision would make 
at some point as these-as the task kind of moves less security towards more political and 
economic, one would think." Press Conference, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld 
with NATO Secretary General Lord Robertson (Oct. 8, 2003), available at 
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/2003/tr20031008-secdefU746.html (last visited June 
24, 2004). "Nothing changes in terms of the Coalition Provisional Authority and the 
Department of Defense. This is still being led by the Pentagon ... " Press Briefing, White 
House Press Secretary Scott McClellan (Oct. 6, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/10/20031006-5.html# 10 (last visited June 
24, 2004). 
21. Iraq Emergency Supplemental Appropriation, supra note 19. The Act requires 
procurement to occur under federal procurement law. Iraq Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriation. Id. The Act requires reports by the Secretary of state on efforts to encourage 
contributions by other countries, to encourage addressing the needs of people with 
disabilities, and to ensure that a new Iraqi constitution preserves religious freedom and 
tolerance of all religious faiths. Id. § 221 S(b ). The act requires that post-conflict stability 
activities "to the maximum extent practicable .. .increase the access of women to, or 
ownership by women of, productive assets such as land, water, agricultural inputs, credit, 
and property in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively; provide long-term financial assistance 
for education for girls and women in Afghanistan and Iraq, respectively; and integrate 
education and training programs for former combatants in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
respectively, with economic development programs to encourage the reintegration of such 
former combatants into society; and promote post-conflict stability in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
respectively." Id. § 2217. 
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Administration for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period," 
negotiated between the CPA and Iraqi leaders and signed March 8, 
2004, provides for the transfer of power from the CPA to a "fully 
sovereign Iraqi Interim Government" that was to take power on June 30, 
2004.22 The U.N. Security Council approved the new arrangement in 
Security Council Resolution 1546, and the CPA disbanded itself in its 
Regulation 9.23 Certain legal questions remained unclear. What was the 
source of authority that the CPA passed to the Interim Government? 
Presumably sovereignty gained as a result of military conquest. What 
force do the CPA regulations have under the new regime? CPA order 
100 provides that CPA regulations remain in force until they are 
changed by the new Interim Government. Presumably the source of 
power to make those regulations was the law of belligerent occupation, 
given the reference by both the U .N. Security Council and the CPA to 
the "laws and usages of war." 
2. Avoid Archaic Limitations on the Exercise of This Sovereignty 
Political Trusteeship argues that successful political trusteeship 
requires that the trustee be free of archaic limitations on the exercise of 
governmental powers, f articularly those derived from the doctrine of 
belligerent occupation. 4 Under this doctrine, a belligerent occupant 
may not make changes in law or institutional arrangements beyond 
those absolutely necessary to protect the security and viability of the 
occupation. If the changes would be difficult to undo if the previous 
sovereign returns, the law of belligerent occupancy prohibits them. 25 On 
the other hand; if a change in the status quo is necessary to protect the 
immediate interests of the population of the occupied territory it is 
permissible, even though the returning sovereign-ante may have 
difficulty undoing it. 26 
Declarations in the Security Council resolutions for Iraq state, 
"sovereignty of Iraq resides in the State of Iraq," combined with express 
limitations on CPA authority to that permitted "under applicable 
international law and to that to "be exercised ... under the laws and 
usages of war," permit the inference that the doctrine of belligerent 
22. See Law of the Administrations for the State of Iraq for the Transitional Period, 
available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/government/TAL.html. (last visited August 26, 2004). 
23. See generally Governing Council Dissolution, available at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20040609 _ CP AREG_9 _ Goveming_ Council_s_Dis 
solution.pdf. (last visited July 8, 2004). 
24. See Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 421-423. 
25. Id. at 412-414. 
26. Id. 
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occupation limits trustee authority.27 The rationale for the limitations 
on change imposed on belligerent occupants is that the "State of Iraq" 
continued to exist notwithstanding the U.S.-led invasion.28 The 
possibility that the limitations of the doctrine of belligerent occupancy 
are acknowledged by the Security Council's reference to "occupying 
powers" and "relevant" and "applicable" international law, and by the 
CPA' s reference to "laws and usages of war" is problematic. 
Respecting these limitations will make fundamental economic, legal, 
and political reform impossible. Ignoring these limitations will 
undercut legitimacy. 
3. Tie Civil Administration to Military Security Forces 
Political Trusteeship argues that successful political trusteeship 
requires close coordination between political trustees and military as 
well as security forces operating in the trust territory.29 Such 
coordination is necessary so that a security environment exists within 
which the exercise of civilian authority is a reality; and decisions by the 
political trustee can be enforced.30 While the military occupation oflraq 
might seem to meet this requirement due to the seamless integration of 
the CPA and the occupying military forces, closer examination of the 
legal structure for the civil administration reveals serious ambiguities 
about who is in charge and how civilian/military coordination is 
supposed to occur. 
The Administrator of the CPA determined, "the Commander of 
U.S. Central Command shall directly support the CPA by deterring 
hostilities; maintaining Iraq's territorial integrity and security; searching 
27. Security Council Resolution 1511, supra note 13, pmbl.; CPA Regulation No. 1 § 
1, ~ 2; see also Pieter H.F. Bekker, ASIL Insights: The Legal Status of Foreign Economic 
Interests in Occupied Iraq (July 2003), at http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl 14.htm (last 
visited June 24, 2004) (arguing that Articles 43 and 46 of Hague Regulations, absent any 
provision in Security Council resolutions voiding contracts or authorizing interference with 
property, require occupying authority to respect pre-invasion contract rights). 
28. The legal requirement that the occupant minimize changes to fundamental laws and 
institutions derives from the legal principle that the ousted power retains sovereignty, "albeit 
in a state of abeyance," over the held territory. The duty to protect the status quo arises from 
international laws recognition of "that kind or precariousness which results from the fact 
that a war is still going on. No matter how unlikely a reversal of fortunes may be in fact, a 
territorial change obtained by a belligerent during and in the course of a war is not treated as 
final state succession, but as 'belligerent occupation."' Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, 
citing and quoting Ernst H. Feilchenfeld, The International Economic Law of Belligerent 
Occupation, 5 ~ 11 (Carnegie Endowment for Int'l Peace, Div. oflnt'l Law, Monograph No. 
6) (1942). 
29. Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 423-424. 
30. Id. 
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for, securing and destroying weapons of mass destruction; and assisting 
in carrying out Coalition policy generally. "31 The shortcoming of this 
order is that it is unclear whether the Administrator of CPA reports to 
the Commander of U.S. Central Command, in which case he lacks the 
authority to give orders to the Commander, or whether the Commander 
reports to him, as the quoted language implies. In the absence of a 
formal delegation of authority from the Secretary of Defense or the 
President to the Administrator of the CPA, the Administrator is not in 
the chain of command of the Commander and thus lacks authority over 
him. 32 Turnover of sovereignty to interim Iraqi authorities exacerbates 
the confusion because now, theoretically, U.S. forces are subject to 
direction by a foreign government. 
B. Failure to Achieve International Legitimacy 
Political Trusteeship argues that successful political trusteeship 
requires international legitimacy, which, in tum, depends on harnessing 
international law, reducing threats to international peace and security, 
holding democratic elections, enforcing human rights, demonstrating 
governmental effectiveness, providing charismatic leadership, and 
bringing an end to national-stage conflicts.33 On the eve of the U.S.-led 
attack, President Bush identified threats to international peace and 
security as the principal justification for starting the war to force 
Saddam Hussein from power.34 In particular, he argued that Saddam 
Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction and the imminent 
31. CPA Regulation No. 1 § l, il 3. 
32. "The commanding officer of the facility is not legally bound to follow the orders of 
anyone outside his operational chain of command, no matter what that person's rank." Lt. 
Commander Thomas C. Wingfield, The Chemical Weapons Convention and the Military 
Commander: Protecting Very Large Secrets in a Transparent Era, 162 MIL. L. REV. 180, 
217 ( 1999). "Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of command to a unified 
or specified combatant command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and 
from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command." See 10 
U.S.C. § 162(b). See generally Jennifer M. Rockoff, Case Note, Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic 
(the Celebici Case), 166 MIL. L. REv. 172 (2000) (discussing prosecutor's obligation to 
demonstrate that person giving orders was in chain of command, in war crimes prosecution). 
The controversy over prisoner abuse and torture by the U.S. armed services in Iraq revealed 
uncertainty even on the part of the Secretary of Defense as to the chain of command. 
33. Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 426-428. 
34. "[T]he Iraqi regime continues to conceal some of the most lethal weapons ever 
devised. It has used weapons of mass destruction. It has a history of reckless aggression and 
a deep hatred for America and our friends. And it has aided terrorists, including al-Qaida. 
Using chemical, biological, or one day, nuclear weapons, obtained with the help of Iraq, 
terrorists could kill thousands, or more." President George W. Bush, Televised Address 
(Mar. 17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030317-
10.html (last visited June 26, 2004) [hereinafter "Bush Speech"]. 
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likelihood of his using them justified immediate use of military force 
without waiting for further U.N. inspections or for explicit authority for 
military force from the U.N. Security Council.35 He asserted that the 
war was legal under the privilege of self-defense and under earlier 
Security Council resolutions. 36 Immediate intervention was also 
justified as necessary to prevent further human rights abuses by the Iraqi 
regime and to install democracy in Iraq.37 The United States largely 
failed to convince the international community that any of these 
justifications was valid. 38 Formal Bush Administration justifications 
touched the bases of international legitimacy, but its political rhetoric 
emphasizing unilateralism, the divergence between its perceptions and 
the perceptions of most of the rest of the world of Iraq's threat to 
international peace and security, and the subsequent lack of concrete 
evidence to back Bush Administration claims, made its references to the 
hallmarks of international legitimacy appear disingenuous or 
incompetent. 39 
1. Harness International Law 
In seeking international support for its intervention in Iraq, the 
Bush Administration underestimated the power of international law as a 
source of international legitimacy. In the Administration's attempt to 
justify invading Iraq, international legal arguments were muted and 
some of the rhetoric suggested that international law was irrelevant.40 
35. Bush Speech, supra note 34. 
36. "We are acting to protect our homeland." Id. "Under U.N. Resolutions 678 and 
687, both still in effect, we are authorized to use force in ridding Iraq of weapons of mass 
destruction." Id. 
37. Id. 
38. See Steven R. Weisman, Threats and Responses: Foreign Policy; A Long Winding 
Road to a Diplomatic Dead End, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2003, at Al. 
39. International legitimacy for the invasion is surely even lower now than at the time 
of the invasion because of revelations by former National Security Council staff and the 
Senate Intelligence Committee that there was no credible evidence of links to al Qaeda or of 
weapons of mass destruction. See RICHARD A. CLARK, AGAINST ALL ENEMIES: INSIDE 
AMERICA'S WAR ON TERROR 30-32 (2004). It is clear to most observers that the Bush 
Administration's decision to start a war in Iraq was motivated by ideology and opportunism 
and not by facts. 
40. Compare Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 
97 AM. J. INT'L LAW 607, 608, 610 (2003) (United States all but discarded "fig leaf' of legal 
justification for attacking Iraq, reflecting broader attack on international law) and Lori Fisler 
Damrosch and Berard H. Oxman, Editors' Introduction: Future Implications of the Iraq 
Conflict, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 553, 553 (2003) (noting absence of explicit legal opinion from 
U.S. government) with William H. Taft, IV and Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and 
International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557 (2003) (stating that U.S. invasion of Iraq "was 
and is lawful"). 
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Achieving international legitimacy for political trusteeship depends 
in substantial measure on persuasive arguments that the intervention 
into the affairs of another country satisfies international law. The 
decades-old debate over the relevance of international law to a 
successful foreign policy and its impact on state behavior continues.41 
Nevertheless, appeals to international law influence public opinion in 
democracies, and, in tum shape the foreign policies of democratic 
govemments.42 The norms of international law also shape the attitudes 
of non-state actors such as the growing universe of Non-Governmental 
Organizations ("NGOs"), which exercise increasing influence in 
international forums and with domestic publics. 
International law's power as a source of international legitimacy is 
strengthened by the evolution of the international relations system. The 
international legal and political system no longer can be represented 
accurately by a model of impermeable states interacting only with each 
other.43 Many private institutions enjoy power in international politics 
and law that rivals that exerted by traditional states.44 "It is through the 
41. See GEORGE F. KENNAN, AT A CENTURY'S ENDING 272 (1996) (denying existence 
of "clear and generally accepted international code of behavior; only interests determine 
state behavior"). 
42. See Jonathan Zasloff, Law and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy: From the 
Gilded Age to the New Era, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 239 , 323 (2003); see Mortimer "Tim" 
Sellers, Book Review, International Law in Antiquity, by David J. Bederman, 15 EMORY 
INT'L L. REv. 521, 525 (2002) ("Then, as now, unfavorable public opinion would punish 
most violations of international law."). Compare JAMES C. HSIUNG, ANARCHY AND ORDER: 
THE INTERPLAY OF POLITICS AND LAW IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 5-26 (1997) 
(criticizing neorealist position and arguing that international law is an "integral part of 
international politics") with JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER, THE TRAGEDY OF GREAT POWER 
POLITICS (2001) (presenting theory of "offensive realism," which denies that anything other 
than power relationships and the desire for hegemony drives international relations). 
43. See Kai Raustiala, The Architecture of International Cooperation: 
Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 11 
(2002) (characterizing states as "disaggregating," and citing critics of billiard-ball theory of 
international relations); Peter G. Danchin, U.S. Unilateralism and the International 
Protection of Religious Freedom: The Multilateral Alternative, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L 
L. 33, 79 (2002) (concluding that billiard-ball view of international relations does not 
comport with realities of human rights movement); Jose E. Alvarez, Comment on Anne 
Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. Soc'y INT'L L. PROC. 240, 
250 (2000) (applauding "insight that states are not opaque billiard balls but collections of 
actors with concrete interests"); Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Joel P. Trachtman, Economic Analysis 
of International Law, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 10 (1999) (noting traditional positivist/realist 
view of international relations "'billiard ball' states that interact only with one another"). 
44. See Jessica T. Mathews, Power Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 59 (1997) (creating new 
constituencies for compliance with international law by NGOs). Francois Rigaux's 
"Transnational Civil Society," involves three types of actors: the state acting through its 
domestic law, the community of states in the international order, and individuals acting 
through private initiatives including NGOs. INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND 
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non governmental organizations and, more and more often, through the 
mass media that world public opinion makes its voice heard on the 
major problems requiring action at the international level."45 NGOs and 
other private actors deal with each other and exert pressure through 
national interest groups, thereby shaping the policies of states.46 
New communication technologies, including the Internet, empower 
national interest groups, strengthening the interpenetration process.47 
The same technologies, as they blur the lines between domestic interest 
groups and international NGOs, also strengthen the power of individuals 
and small-group interests-weak in domestic politics-to be expressed 
and given fulfillment through international NGOs.48 No longer is the 
choice of intervention solely the province of political elites and 
professionals in diplomacy; now, due to information technology and the 
growing influence of NGOs and other international interest groups, it is 
a mass political question. Democratization strengthens the effect of 
international law because international law, as rhetoric, influences 
masses more than it influences leadership cadres, who are more likely to 
set policy based on interests in the realist tradition. 
The Bush Administration conspicuously failed to mobilize 
international law as a source of international legitimacy, in significant 
PROSPECTS 12 (Mohammed Bedjaoui ed., 1991 ). 
45. INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 44; see generally Martin Wolf, Uncivil Society, 
FINANCIAL TIMES, Sept. 1, 1999, at 12 (lamenting role of NGOs in blocking negotiation of 
multilateral agreement on investment; "only elected governments can be property 
responsible for the making of law, domestically and internationally .... to grant any private 
interests a direct voice in negotiations over how coercion is to be applied is fundamentally 
subversive of constitutional democracy"). "If NGOs were indeed representative of the 
wishes and desires of the electorate those who embrace their ideas would be in power. Self 
evidently, they are not." Id. 
46. Professor Koh's "transnationalist" school of international relations theory 
emphasizes the role of private actors in international law. Harold Hongju Koh, 
Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 183-85 (1996). 
47. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., The Internet is Changing the Public International Legal 
System, 88 KY. L. REV. 885 (2000). 
48. In his illuminating synthesis of competing and overlapping strands of international 
law, Harold Koh explores the process of "norm internalization." Cf Harold Hongju Koh, 
Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599, 2645 (1997); Harold 
Hongju Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing International Law Home, 35 Haus. L. 
REv. 623 (1998) (offering examples of internalization of international law: 12-mile 
territorial limit from UNCLOS III, landmines treaty, European Human Rights Convention, 
torture convention). The process can be viewed at three overlapping and potentially 
reinforcing levels: the level of the international system itself; the level of individuals and 
groups who make up the state; and the processes and institutions of domestic politics. He 
explains that transnational actors such as public officials, "norm entrepreneurs," and NGOs 
mobilize domestic elites and popular constituencies and set in motion a domestic political 
process that internationalizes a norm of international law. See id. at 2649-50. 
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part because of its embrace of neorealist theories of international 
relations that demean the effect of international law.49 It failed to 
convince the international community that its invasion was justified by 
the privilege of self-defense, and it gained only marginally greater 
acceptance of the proposition that the invasion was legal because it was 
authorized by earlier Security Council resolutions on Iraq.50 
(a) Understand that International Law Operates Within an Evolving 
Seto/Norms 
International law is not fixed; it evolves through a combination of 
state practice and opinio Juris. Several commentators and the National 
Security Strategy document issued by the Bush Administration, argue 
that the U.S.-led invasion oflraq was an appropriate and necessary way 
to modify the privilege of self-defense recognized in customary 
international law and incorporated into Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. 
The modification brings the privilege in line, they argue, with the 
realities of a world in which little warning of terrorist attacks or attacks 
with weapons of mass destruction can be expected.51 
International law evolves in response to changes in state practice, 
but the U.S. invasion of Iraq represented a revolution-or perhaps a 
renunciation-with respect to international law.52 Unlike Israel's 
49. Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1479, 1521 
(2003) ("Iraq invasion was illegal under international law"); Miriam Shapiro, Iraq: the 
Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599, 603 (2003) (arguing that 
the U.S. could not justify invasion of Iraq as self-defense because no evidence of imminent 
threat); Richard A. Falk, What Future for the UN Charter System of War Prevention, 97 
AM. J.INT'L L. 590, 598 (2003) (showing that facts did not support the case for preemption 
because there was neither imminence nor necessity); Richard A. Falk, What Future for the 
UN Charter System of War Prevention, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 592 (2003) (characterizing 
worldwide reaction to Bush Administration plans and justification for invading Iraq as 
"highly critical"). 
50. Taft, supra note 40 (arguing that U.S. invasion of Iraq was legal because it 
responded to a material breach of Iraq's obligations under earlier U.N. Security Council 
resolutions, and that this justification was accepted in Security Council Resolution 1441 ). 
51. See generally, The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited June 24, 2004) [hereinafter 
NSS document]; Taft, supra note 40, at 563 (recognizing preemptive use of forceful law 
"need to adapt the concept of imminence to the capabilities and objectives of today's 
adversaries"); id. at 563 (recognizing preemptive use of force lawful where it represents 
episode in ongoing broader conflict and consistent with Security Council resolutions). 
52. Jane E. Stromseth, Law and Force after Iraq: A Transitional Moment, 97 AM. J. 
INT'L L. 628, 635 (2003) (noting that U.S. failed to pursue effectively opportunity to use 
unilateral action to force evolution in international law because it articulated preemption 
doctrine with uncertain and broad parameters instead of a more focused position); Shapiro, 
supra note 47, at 604-05 (2003) (noting possibility that international law of self-defense 
needs to adapt, but U.S. could have promoted adaptation more effectively by more limited 
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preemptive attacks against Egypt and Syria in 1967, Iraq did not have a 
massed army, ready to attack the United States.53 Moreover, the avowed 
purpose of the U.S. invasion of Iraq was to displace a sitting 
government; Israel pursued only a counter-force strategy, and left the 
governments of Syria and Egypt intact. There was no imminent threat 
from Iraq, and the U.S. strategy was not proportional to the threat that 
existed.54 
The Iraq invasion differed significantly from preceding instances 
of international intervention. Unlike Desert Storm, the goal in Iraq in 
2003 was regime change. Unlike Desert Storm, there was no advance 
U .N. Security Council resolution and there was no broad coalition. In 
Iraq in 2003, a political trusteeship resulted without U.N. approval. The 
sitting government continued after Desert Storm, albeit subject to 
significant U.N.-approved economic and security sanctions. Unlike the 
international intervention in Bosnia, U.S. intervention in Iraq displaced 
a sovereign government, establishing a foreign political trustee with full 
executive, legislative, and judicial powers. Unlike Kosovo, Iraq was not 
supported by a real coalition of major states. 55 The post-war civil 
administration was unilateral, not multilateral. 56 The political 
trusteeship was an aspect of military occupation; not the responsibility 
of a separate civil administration. 57 
While plausible arguments exist that international law needs to 
evolve in the wake of the September 11, 2001 attacks against the United 
States, the Iraq invasion was not incremental, which would have 
enhanced claims of a deliberate effort by the U.S. to nudge international 
norms in the right direction. Rather, it was radical, and thus, more easily 
viewed as a renunciation of those norms altogether. 
action and rhetoric). 
53. See Shapiro, supra note 47, at 601 (describing Israel's justifications for 1967 attack 
on Egyptian forces, and 1981 attack on Iraq nuclear facility). 
54. See Falk, supra note 47, at 592 (noting lack of evidence of need for Iraq invasion to 
prevent use of weapons of mass destruction). 
55. See generally Stromseth, supra note 50, at 633-34 (rejecting resolution by U.N. 
Security Council to condemn Kosovo intervention created opportunity to adapt international 
law). 
56. The head of the CPA was appointed by the Secretary of Defense and/or the 
President of the United States, and asserted in his first official issuance sole executive 
legislative and judicial authority. See CPA, supra note 17. 
57. See generally Falk, supra note 47, at 591 (noting efforts by Independent 
International Commission on Kosovo to reconcile Kosovo intervention with obligations 
under U.N. Charter). 
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(b) Reconcile Principles of Sovereignty and Self-Determination 
The U.S.-led intervention in Iraq failed to draw legitimacy from 
international law's respect for sovereignty or from its respect for self-
determination. After the end of World War I, the international 
community struggled to integrate the conflicting norms of respect for 
sovereignty and self-determination into the international legal system. 
Intervention in support of either norm enjoyed a measure of legitimacy 
in the international community. 
The conflicts in Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor were the products 
of struggles for self-determination by a minority population against 
assertions of sovereignty by an overarching state. 58 International 
intervention in those cases could be justified by the need for 
intervention to protect the privilege of self-determination and the need 
to protect human rights of populations seeking self-determination, even 
though intervention undermined claims of sovereignty. 59 The 1991 
military action in Kuwait and Iraq could be justified as necessary to 
protect Kuwait's sovereignty. 
The U.S.-led invasion oflraq in 2003 flouted both sovereignty and 
self-determination. Iraq's sovereignty was intact under Saddam Hussein 
and he presented no imminent threat to the sovereignty of any other 
state. The Bush administration expressed the goal of self-determination 
for the peoples of Iraq, but was vague as to which peoples needed 
international intervention to realize their aspirations of separate or 
different government. Moreover, the facts did not support intervention 
based on the principle of self-determination. Unlike Bosnia, where the 
seceding state had declared independence after a referendum; unlike 
East Timor, where the people of a specific territory petitioned the 
international community for separation after a referendum; and unlike 
Kosovo, where a separate and parallel government existed, backed up 
by a growing guerrilla insurgency; the desire for political change in Iraq 
arose in the minds of the leadership of a foreign state rather than from 
the objective behavior of peoples in Iraq.60 
58. See Political Trusteeship, supra note 1 at 398 n. 53 (Bosnia), 401 n. 69 (Kosovo), 
403 n. 75 (East Timor). 
59. Moreover, in all three cases, the state asserting sovereignty ultimately consented to 
the intervention. 
60. See generally Falk, supra note 47, at 591 (identifying possibilities that Iraq 
invasion could be justified as necessary to end crimes against humanity and to prepare Iraqi 
people for political democracy and economic success). 
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(c) Seek Consent or U.N Approval 
Generally, popular opinion accepts the premise that political 
trusteeship or military action leading up to political trusteeship is not 
permissible under international law unless the United Nations Security 
Council approves the international intervention in advance. This 
premise enjoys uncertain support in both state practice and in 
scholarship of international law. Nevertheless, approval by the U.N. 
Security Council, either before or after the fact, is broadly perceived as 
a powerful source of legality and international legitimacy: 
"[T]he preemptive use of force by the United States against Iraq or 
any other sovereign nation pursuant to an appropriate authorization by 
the Security Council would seem to be consonant with international 
law. Less clear is whether international law currently allows the 
preemptive use of force by a nation or group of nations without 
Security Council authorization. "61 
Of the major post-Cold War political trusteeships, only East Timor and 
Bosnia enjoyed unequivocal approval in advance.62 In Kosovo, advance 
approval for the NA TO bombing campaign was not sought, but advance 
approval by the U.N. preceded the entry of NATO troops and the 
establishment of the U.N.-run political trusteeship.63 In Afghanistan, the 
U.N. Security Council resolution did not clearly approve the use of 
force. In Iraq, advance approval was altogether lacking. 
Under Article 51, advance approval of military force by the 
Security Council is unnecessary when application of force is justified as 
"self-defense."64 Most experts question whether the U.S.-led invasion 
of Iraq complied with the privilege of self-defense under international 
law.65 Subsequent U.N. Security Council resolutions recognize the fact 
of U.S. trusteeship, but are ambiguous about its legal scope, 
emphasizing the need to return responsibility to Iraqi institutions, 
which, they say, have never relinquished sovereignty.66 
61. David M. Ackerman, International Law and the Preemptive Use of Force Against 
Iraq, CRS Report to Congress (Mar. 17, 2003) (Order Code RS21314), at 
http://www.usembassy.at/en/download/pdf/iraq_intlaw.pdf (last visited June 24, 2004). 
62. See Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 398-99, 403. 
63. Klinton V. Alexander, NATO's Intervention in Yugoslavia: The Legal Case for 
Violating Yugoslavia's Sovereignty in the Absence of Security Council Approval, 22 Hous. 
J. INT'L L. 403, 430 (2000). 
64. U.N. CHARTER, art. 51. 
65. See Frederic L. Kirgis, ASIL Insights: Pre-emptive Action to Forestall Terrorism 
(June 2002), available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh88.htm (last visited June 24, 
2004) (summarizing arguments for and against legality). 
66. See Bekker, supra note 27. 
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Post-invasion U.S. policy did not seek clear U.N. Security Council 
approval until the June, 2004 handover. National Security Advisor Rice 
said, at the beginning of the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, that the United 
States envisioned only a limited role for the U.N. in the political 
trusteeship for Iraq.67 In November of 2003, Germany, Britain, and 
France called for an international conference on Iraq, similar to the 
conference held for Afghanistan in 2001.68 Such a conference 
presumably could have worked out a mandate to be adopted by the 
Security Council, as similar conferences did in Bosnia, Kosovo, and 
Afghanistan.69 The United States asked the Security Council to wait for 
a letter from the Iraq Governing Council, expected to contain 
"instructions" regarding U .N. involvement in the ongoing political 
trusteeship in Iraq.70 
The Bush Administration has paid the price of reduced 
international legitimacy by sidelining the U.N. in order to have the 
benefits of better control over a political trusteeship aimed at 
establishing internal legitimacy, building the institutions of a liberal 
democracy, and defining for itself an appropriate exit strategy.71 
Whether the results prove worth the price depends on much greater 
success than is apparent so far in increasing internal legitimacy for the 
political trusteeship, building the institutions of liberal democracy, and 
in linking an exit strategy to concrete progress in building local 
capacity. 
67. "The coalition is committed to working in partnership with international 
institutions, including, of course, the United Nations. But I would just caution that Iraq is 
not East Timor, or Kosovo, or Afghanistan. Iraq is unique." 
"When I said that this isn't East Timor, that was a new state. When I said, not Afghanistan; 
that was a failed state. When I said, not Kosovo; it's not a state at all. Clearly, that's not 
Iraq. And Iraq is a country with a pretty sophisticated bureaucracy, for instance. I think we 
will look to see what technocratic talent there is among civil servants that can help in the 
rebuilding of Iraq." National Security Advisor Dr. Condoleezza Rice, Press Briefing (Apr. 
4, 2003), available at http://usinfo.state.gov/topical/pol/terror/texts/03040412.htm (last 
visited June 24, 2004). 
68. Kirk Semple, Germany, France and Russia ask U.N. to Call International Meeting 
on Iraq's Future, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2003, at A7. 
69. The Dayton Accords were negotiated outside U .N. auspices, and subsequently 
adopted by the Security Council. See Political Trusteeships, supra note 1. Negotiations 
outside the U.N. by the "Contact Group" produced the framework for political trusteeship 
subsequently adopted in Security Council Resolution 1244. See id. The Berlin Agreement 
was negotiated outside the U .N. and subsequently incorporated by reference in Security 
Council resolutions. See id. 
70. Id. 
71. See infra Part Il.C.; see infra Part 11.D.; see infra Part ILE. 
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2. Reduce Threats to International Peace and Security 
Even if the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and its subsequent political 
trusteeship violated international law in a formal sense, these actions 
might nevertheless have enjoyed a sense of international legitimacy if 
the United States had proven correct in its assertion that its unilateral 
use of military force was necessary to protect the peace and security of 
other states. As the U.S.-led attack against Iraq began, President Bush 
claimed that the war and the elimination of Saddam Hussein from 
power would enhance international peace and security. 72 The absence of 
evidence of ties between the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein and al 
Qaeda or other international terrorist organizations and the absence of 
weapons of mass destruction have negated this possibility. 
The U.S.-led invasion of Iraq may actually have increased threats 
to international peace and security. In the words of a United States 
Institute of Peace review author: 
"[S]o far as the battle against al Qaeda is concerned, the invasion of 
Iraq was a non sequitur. No convincing evidence of a substantive link 
between the Baghdad regime and Osama bin Laden's organization has 
ever been presented, and, in fact, the intelligence record of the last 
decade suggests that while contacts may have occurred and terrorist 
operatives may have crossed through Iraq, no collaborative efforts of 
note have occurred between the arch-secularist Baath regime and the 
radical fundamentalists of al Qaeda. 
"For the war on terrorism in the broadest sense, the invasion of Iraq 
brought two important advantages: A state sponsor of terrorism, albeit 
a rather inactive one, has been removed, and the demonstration of 
military might in toppling Saddam Hussein's regime has given the 
United States more leverage against the outstanding state sponsors of 
terrorism-Iran and Syria .... But as a threat to U.S. interests, the 
state sponsors are of relatively minor consequence compared to the 
non-state actors such as al Qaeda-which may in fact benefit from the 
American occupation of Iraq .... How does al Qaeda benefit? The 
greatest windfall for bin Laden's forces comes in the realm of 
propaganda, not a small issue for a movement that views establishing 
itself as the undisputed champion of Islam as a primary goal. By 
occupying Iraq, the United States has given al Qaeda a major 
72. President Bush stated, "In a free Iraq, there will be no more wars of aggression 
against neighbors ... " The White House, Global Message (Apr. 5, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/04/20030405-1.html (last visited June 24, 
2004). See also Press Briefing, supra note 67 ("Our goals are clear: We will help Iraqis 
build an Iraq that is whole, free and at peace with itself and with its neighbors; an Iraq that is 
disarmed of all WMD; that no longer supports or harbors terror . . ."). 
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opportunity to drive home its argument that the "leader of world 
infidelity" seeks to destroy Islam and subjugate its believers. This has 
been at the very core of al Qaeda's message throughout its existence, 
and the group is now using the example of Iraq to reap gains in the 
areas of recruitment and fundraising. 
"Independent polling by groups such as the Pew Foundation and 
others has established that conditions are ripe for this message since 
there has been a massive tum in public opinion against America in the 
last two years. The data suggest that the long slow erosion of positive 
feelings about the United States has given way to a landslide during 
the period of the war on terror, and especially during the run-up to the 
invasion of Iraq. A long-term U.S. presence in Iraq, a central country 
within the historic realm of Islam and a longtime seat of the caliphate, 
will make it difficult to reverse these impressions. Positive perceptions 
about the reconstruction of Iraq may help, but they will have to be 
strong ones, widely affirmed by Iraqis themselves, to reverse this 
trend. 
"There are also further threats, such as proliferation of weapons and 
other dangerous materials. In the worst-case scenario, weapons of 
mass destruction material may have been privatized by regime 
adherents who know their future in an American-guided Iraq is 
unpromising. Additionally, weapons such as shoulder-fired anti-
aircraft missiles, of which Iraq had many, may have fallen into 
terrorist hands-a }'ossibility that has been voiced by senior U.S. 
military officials." 7 
The Peace Institute report makes it clear that U.S. intervention in Iraq 
does not enjoy international legitimacy based on its mitigation of threats 
to international peace and security. 
3. Hold Democratic Elections 
In Iraq, the United States has failed thus far to employ democratic 
elections to build international legitimacy for its political trusteeship. 74 
Democratic elections serve two purposes in legitimating political 
trusteeships. First, they serve to express the self-determination 
aspirations of a people opposing exercise of sovereignty by a state of 
which they are a part or a regime to which they are subject. Second, 
73. United States Institute of Peace, Global Terrorism after the Iraq War (Oct. 2003), 
available at http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/srl 11.html (last visited June 24, 2004). 
74. As Part II.B § 3, explains, premature democratic elections may undercut the success 
of a political trusteeship in establishing a liberal democracy. U.S. reluctance to accept early 
democratic elections in Iraq may be prudent, but the point made by the text is that failure to 
hold elections undercuts international legitimacy in the short run. Political Trusteeship, 
supra note 1, at 437-38, 449-451. 
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democratic elections validate local governmental institutions that the 
trustee is preparing for eventual self-government. 75 
As self-determination is a potent legal basis for intruding on 
sovereignty, elections linked to the power of self-determination are a 
powerful source of international legitimacy for international 
intervention. 76 Elections in Bosnia in 1991, in Kosovo in 1991, and in 
East Timor in 1982 served this function. 77 With democracy as an 
increasingly embraced goal of the international legal system, post-
intervention elections support claims that the political trusteeship is 
necessary in part to help local populations achieve the benefits of 
democracy.78 Elections, under the supervision of a political trustee in 
Bosnia in 1996, in Kosovo in 2000, and in East Timor in 2001, served 
this function. President Bush embraced the spread of democracy as a 
goal of the international order.79 
In Iraq, the United States launched a military attack without any 
popularly declared will for intervention or change in political 
arrangements.80 The U.S.-led political trustee resisted early local 
75. See Rogers M. Smith, Legitimating Reconstruction: the Limits of Legalism, 108 
YALE L. J. 2039, 2039-40 (1999). (characterizing Abraham Lincoln's View "All 
governments ... derive their powers from the consent of the governed); Stuart Ford, OSCA 
National Minority Rights in the United States: the Limits of Conflict Prevention, 23 
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 1, 8 (1999). (quoting OSCE sources "will of the people, 
freely and fairly expressed through periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the 
authority and legitimacy of all government.) 
76. See Karen Heymann, Earned Sovereignty for Kashmir: The Legal Methodology to 
Avoiding a Nuclear Holocaust, 19 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 153, 177-180 (2003) (discussing 
utility of plebiscites, referenda, and other elections in resolving claims to self-
determination). If a people have voted to secede, their vote tends to increase the legitimacy 
of international intervention to give effect to their desires expressed at the ballot box. 
77. See Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 398-404 (discussing antecedents of war 
in Bosnia, including declaration of independence after referendum, discussing the 
declaration of independence in Kosovo and discussing antecedents of international 
intervention in East Timor). 
78. See THOMAS CAROTHER, AIDING DEMOCRACY ABROAD 9 (1999) (criticizing 
preoccupation with elections at the expense of other elements of democratization); id. at 91 
(explaining emphasis on elections in democratization efforts); id. at 135 (explaining that 
international community emphasizes elections to get legitimate government in place quickly 
and facilitate exit strategy). 
79. President George W. Bush, remarks at the 201h Anniversary of the National 
Endowment for Democracy (Nov. 6, 2003), available at 
http://www.ned.org/events/anniversary/octl 603-Bush.html (last visited June 24, 2004) ("In 
the early 1970s, there were about 40 democracies in the world. As the 20th century ended, 
there were around 120 democracies in the world-and I can assure you more are on the 
way."). 
80. No elections in Iraq before the U.S. invasion in March, 2003, produced any calls 
for deposing the Saddam Hussein regime or for international intervention to depose him. 
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demands for elections and instead appointed members of the Governing 
Council, seeking to validate the exercise of power by local political 
leadership and institutions.81 Further, the trustee backed off from 
expressed plans to write a constitution and subject it to electoral 
approval before turning over power to the appointed institutions. 82 
Democratic elections as a source of international legitimacy have 
thus played no role in Iraq so far. The Bush Administration apparently 
envisioned, not early democratic elections, but spontaneous 
"emergence" of representative leadership.83 Now, elections are 
scheduled for January, 2005, but it is not clear as of this writing whether 
they will be held, or if held, successful. 
4. Enforce Human Rights 
When political trustees enhance recognition and enforcement of 
human rights, they enjoy greater international legitimacy. One of the 
changes in the international law of sovereignty and non-intervention, 
codified in Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, is the growing recognition 
that egregious human rights abuses can justify international intervention 
notwithstanding opposition by the sovereign committing the abuses. 84 
Part of the justification for the U.S.-led attack against Iraq was Saddam 
Hussein's abuse of human rights within Iraq. As the U.S.-led attack 
against Iraq began, President Bush claimed that the war and the removal 
of Saddam Hussein from power would enhance human rights in lraq.85 
81. See Joel Brinkley, U.S. Rejects Iraqi Plan to Hold Census by Summer, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 4, 2003, at page Al 8, col. 1; Archie Tse, A Region Inflamed: Baghdad Politics, Then 
and Now; In Dispute: The Caucus Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2003, at page All, col. 1 (both 
reporting on U.S. resistance to early post-invasion elections). See also notes 137-146 infra 
and accompanying text. 
82. Id. 
83. "When you get rid of the reign of fear that Saddam Hussein has wreaked on people 
who hold their communities together, you're going to see leadership emerge." "And so it's 
not as if somebody is picking these people; these people are emerging from Iraq. Just as in 
the exile community, these are people who have emerged because they have fought the long 
fight and they ought to be a part of Iraq's future." "Ultimately, there will have to be a 
process of elections and all of the things that go with democracy that will finally affirm what 
the actual government of Iraq will be. But in this interim stage, there's no reason to believe 
that the Iraqis cannot help-cannot identify the people who will be a part of the interim Iraqi 
[administration]." Press Briefing, supra note 67. 
84. See Oona A. Hathaway, The Cost of Commitment, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1821, 1827 
n.16 (2003) (favoring and opposing overriding sovereignty based on human rights abuses by 
collection authorities); Modibo Ocran, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in Light 
of Robust Peacekeeping, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2002) (reviewing shift toward 
acceptance of humanitarian intervention). 
85. "In a free Iraq, there will be ... no more executions of dissidents ... no more torture 
chambers and rape rooms." Global Message, supra note 72. 
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After President Bush declared the military phase of the 
intervention complete, the Administration continued to consider the 
enhancement of human rights as a goal of the political trusteeship. 86 
Arguably, Administration' reluctance to have elections that might result 
in Shiite dominance was consistent with a position aimed at protecting 
rights of minorities. Nevertheless, the conduct of occupation forces, the 
absence of judicial review, and the protracted detention of persons 
without statement of charges or access to counsel raises questions 
among human rights activists as to the success of the occupying 
authorities in improving human rights.87 Prisoner abuse by U.S. armed 
forces entirely undermined any claim that the intervention effectively 
enhanced human rights protection. 88 
5. Develop Governmental Effectiveness 
In seeking international legitimacy for a political trusteeship, 
nothing succeeds like success. If the early stages of political trusteeship 
in Iraq had been as successful as the military campaign, some of the 
international skepticism about the merits of invading and the legitimacy 
of post-invasion political trusteeship would have dissipated. Instead, 
the chaos and singular inability of the occupying forces to deliver 
effective government undermined international legitimacy. 89 It would 
have been bad enough if the United States had been perceived as having 
a clear plan for its political trusteeship after Saddam Hussein was 
deposed and then had difficulty turning it into reality. It was far worse 
that there was no plan and, apparently, indifference to the need for a 
plan. This reinforced international perceptions that the United States 
was committed to belligerent unilateralism in the military sphere but 
86. United States Department of State, Interview of the President by Al-Sharq Al-Awsat 
(Nov. 19, 2003), available at http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/2003/26561pf.htm (last 
visited June 24, 2004) (referring to a basic law to protect individual rights and minority 
participation in Iraqi government before power is transferred, even if constitution is not 
written before then). 
87. See Amnesty International, Reconstruction After the War in Iraq - The Human 
Rights View (Aug. 2003), available at 
http://web.amnesty.org/web/wire.nsf/August2003/Iraq (last visited June 24, 2004) 
(criticizing the lack of accountability of the occupying authority and at those participating in 
reconstruction). Iraq: Amnesty International reveals a pattern of torture and ill-treatment, 
available at http://web.amnesty.org/pages/irq-torture-eng (last visited July 8, 2004). 
88. Id. 
89. Fareed Zakaria, Our Last Real Chance, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 19, 2004, at 44. (reporting 
on poor planning by Bush administration, leading to lack of security and legitimacy in 
violent post-invasion Iraq); Babak Dehganpiseh et al., We are Your Martyrs, NEWSWEEK, 
Apr. 19, 2004, at 36. (reporting on failure of U.S. to anticipate sources of violent resistance 
in post-invasion Iraq). 
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was incapable of appreciating the complexity of successful 
nationbuilding. 90 
The widespread looting in the earliest days of the political 
trusteeship was obviously a bad start; and continued inability of the 
political trustee to provide basic security undercuts any perception that 
the trusteeship was effective even on the basics.91 Continued lack of 
transparency and accessibility to the general Iraqi public, dumping the 
first civil administrator, Jay Gamer, two major zigzags on approaches to 
elections and writing a constitution all reinforce the perception of the 
Iraq trusteeship as bumbling rather than effective.92 Gamer, the former 
civil administrator, acknowledged poor planning and reported an order 
by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that he dismiss Tom 
Warrick, the State Department official responsible for an extensive State 
Department study on post-war planning in Iraq-a study which forecast 
extensive looting, among other things. 93 This is evidence of indifference 
to the efficacy of post-invasion governmental effectiveness. 
Escalating violence throughout 2004 continued to thwart the goal 
of effective government. 
6. Install Charismatic Leadership 
Charismatic leadership of the political trustee at the outset of 
trusteeship enhances international legitimacy. A charismatic foreign 
administrator like Douglas McArthur in Japan, or a charismatic local 
like Winston Churchill, can build international support simply by asking 
for it and working to obtain it.94 In Iraq, there was no such leadership. 
The United States government apparently thought that Ahmad 
Chalabi might play this role but his capacity to mobilize international 
public opinion in his favor was largely frustrated by initial perceptions 
that he has a corrupt past, growing perceptions that he had little support 
90. See Zakaria, supra note 89. 
91. Id. 
92. See Tamara Lipper et al., About-Face in Iraq, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 24, 2003, at 30 
(reporting on reversals of course in U.S. post-invasion administration oflraq). 
93. Warrick had earned the enmity of the Bush Administration by opposing the 
deference the Defense Department gives to Iraqi exiles during the planning process. See 
Lawrence F. Kaplan, The State Department's Anti-Democracy Plan for Iraq, NEW 
REPUBLIC, Nov. 2003 (reporting that Warrick tried to bar participation by the Iraqi National 
Congress in planning meetings). The order to dismiss Warrick apparently came from Vice 
President Cheney. Id. 
94. MacArthur was a paradigmatic leader of a political trusteeship with charisma 
reaching into the international community. Churchill is an example, not of a leader involved 
in a political trusteeship, but of a national leader who projected his charisma abroad to build 
international support, especially in the United States. 
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from within Iraq and, later, by charges that he spied for Iraq. 95 But at 
least he was willing to play the role, actively working to build support in 
key constituencies at the United Nations and the United States, as well 
as those in Iraq. 96 American and other international leaders have been 
less successful. General Jay Gamer, the initial choice to lead the 
political trusteeship was singularly ill-suited, lacking political or 
diplomatic experience and apparently thought to be qualified only 
because Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld knew him personally.97 
Ambassador Bremer seemed to be a better choice, presenting a 
buttoned-down diplomatic persona reinforced by confidence and an aura 
of competence.98 However, he never seemed to campaign actively 
either in foreign capitals or with the Iraqi population. It is not clear that 
ordinary observers would characterize him as "charismatic. "99 It 
remains to be seen whether U.S.-picked Prime Minister Iyad Allawi will 
prove more charismatic. In his election-season trip to the U.S. his 
performance best can be described as "wooden." 
In any event, the leadership element of the political trusteeship in 
Iraq would be better served by an experienced effective democratic 
politician such as Paddy Ashdown as High Commissioner in Bosnia. 100 
The appointment of U .N. High Commissioner for Human Rights Sergio 
95. Compare Max Singer, After Saddam: The Controversy over Ahmad Chalabi, 
NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE, June 20, 2002, available at 
http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/comment-singer062002.asp (last visited June 24, 
2004) (reporting controversy over whether Chalabi "has the potential to be one of the great 
Arab leaders of this century" or whether he is a small time opportunist and playboy trying to 
use his position in the Iraqi National Congress to make something for himself') with David 
Com, Postwar Democracy? Iraq is a Hard Place, THE NATION, Mar. 26, 2003, available at 
http://www.thenation.com/capitalgames/index.mhtml?bid=3&pid=519 (last visited June 24, 
2004) (describing most Iraqis and U.S. military veterans as suspicious of Chalabi, "a 
millionaire Ahmed Chalabi, who has lived outside Iraq since 1956 and who was convicted 
of financial fraud in Jordan in 1992. (He claims it was a set-up.)"). Those who know him 
variously characterize Chalabi as "intelligent and charming," and of "dubious integrity." 
See James Risen & David Johnston, The Reach of the War: The Offense: Chalabi 
Reportedly told Iran that US. Had Code, N.Y. TIMES, June 2, 2004, at 1 (reporting on 
claims that Chalabi compromised U.S. intelligence secrets to Iran). 
96. Dexter Filkins, The Struggle for Iraq: Leadership; Chalabi, Nimble Exile, Searches 
for Role in Iraq, N.Y TIMES, Mar. 26, 2004 at AlO (reporting ton Chalabi's energetic efforts 
to build support for various constituencies). 
97. Michael Hirsh, The State Dept. Wins One, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 30, 2003, National 
Affairs section (reporting on replacement of Gamer by Bremer, noting Gamer's relationship 
with Rumsfeld). 
98. See Michael Hirsh, Racing the Clock in Iraq, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 2004, at 32 
(reporting on Bremer's administration oflraq). 
99. Id. 
100. See Gerald Knaus & Felix Martin, Travails of the European Raj, available at 
http://www.joumalofdemocracy.org/articles/KnausandMartin.pdf (last visited July 8, 2004). 
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Vieira de Mello as the top UN official in Iraq was a step in the right 
direction. But he had barely begun when he was assassinated; a major 
setback to installing charismatic leadership at the head of the political 
trusteeship. 101 
7. Bring an End to National-Stage Conflicts 
The justification for international intervention into the affairs of a 
state often relates to inability-or unwillingness-of the existing 
government to protect human rights and to maintain minimal physical 
security. A political trustee gains international legitimacy when it 
demonstrates the capacity to end-or at least to control-conflicts on the 
national stage. In Iraq, part of the basis for continued international 
sanctions and restrictions such as no-fly zones was to prevent human 
rights abuses of the Kurds and of other ethnic or religious groups 
opposed to Saddam Hussein. 102 
If the U.S.-led occupation had mitigated these underlying intra-Iraq 
conflicts, it might have attracted some measure of international 
legitimacy for its intervention. But as of December 2003, the 
intervention had not reduced national-stage conflicts between Sunni and 
Shi'a Muslims and between these groups and the Kurds. 103 Indeed, the 
CPA regularly was caught off guard by these conflicts, and was forced 
to back away from its insistence that the Governing Council write a 
constitution because ethnic and religious conflicts within the Governing 
Council made writing a constitution infeasible. 104 
Apart from insisting that the Governing Council proceed with a 
process for becoming more effective and preparing to receive more 
authority, the CPA revealed no real plan for bridging the conflicts that 
had undermined the Council's effectiveness. Neither the Bush 
Administration nor the CPA advanced any new ideas, such as the one 
advanced by Leslie Gelb on November 25, 2003, to divide Iraq into 
three separate states, or largely autonomous areas within a formal 
101. Dexter Filkins & Richard A. Oppel, Jr., After the War: Truck Bombing; Huge 
Suicide Blast Demolished U.N. Headquarters in Baghdad; Top Officials Among 17 Dead, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2003, at 1 (reporting on attack that Killed Viera). 
102. No-fly zones: The Legal Position, Feb. 19, 2001, available at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/1175950.stm (last visited July 8, 2004) 
(describing the purpose ofno-fly zones as protecting Kurds and Shi'a Muslims). 
103. How to Rebuild Iraq, PEACE WATCH ONLINE No. 2, 10 (June, 2004) at 
http://www.usip.org/peacewatch/2004/6/iraq4.html (last visited July 8, 2004) (discussing 
inter-ethnic and inter-religious conflicts in post-invasion Iraq). 
104. FALEH A. ]ABAR, POSTCONFLICT IRAQ: A RACE FOR STABILITY, RECONSTRUCTION, 
AND LEGITIMACY, U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE, SPEC. REP. No. 120 (2004). 
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Iraq. 105 As of this writing, not only does the Iraq intervention not draw 
international legitimacy from its effectiveness in ending national-stage 
conflicts, it looks like it is creating a situation in which these conflicts 
may become more problematic than they were under the preceding 
regime-in terms of political stability, if not human rights protection. 
C. F ai/ure to Achieve Internal Legitimacy 
Political Trusteeship argues that political trusteeships are unlikeiy 
to succeed unless they build internal legitimacy, which, in tum, depends 
on delivering effective government, promoting governmental 
transparency, providing mechanisms for judicial review, promoting 
popular confidence in local institutions, respecting indigenous personal 
and group pride, implementing structures compatible with common 
ideology, and harnessing tribal custom. 106 These tests for internal 
legitimacy overlap the prescriptions for building a liberal democracy, 
considered in Part 11.D. 
The Bush Administration's intervention in Iraq deserves no higher 
marks for its quest for internal legitimacy than for its failure to obtain 
international legitimacy. Difficulties in obtaining internal legitimacy for 
the political trusteeship in Iraq are due, not to flaws in the approaches 
being pursued by mid-2004, but to the absence of any coherent plan for 
civil administration before the occupation began. 107 Early mis-steps in 
civil administration may have undermined internal legitimacy to such an 
extent that belated attention to the hallmarks of internal legitimacy came 
too late. Nevertheless, the experience in Iraq may provide useful 
nationbuilding lessons for the future. Iraq may be viewed in retrospect 
as an opportunity lost, where success was jeopardized by the failure to 
apply lessons learned from past political trusteeships from the outset, 
instead relying on a naive expectation that a liberal democracy would 
fall into place spontaneously as soon as Saddam Hussein was removed 
by military force. 
1. Deliver Effective Government 
Governmental effectiveness, beginning with basic security-"law 
and order"-is a powerful foundation for internal legitimacy. As 
Political Trusteeship pointed out, instances abound in which a local 
105. Leslie H. Gelb, The Three-State Solution, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2003, at A27. 
106. Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 442 (summarizing bases of internal 
legitimacy). 
107. JABAR, supra note 104 (describing pre-war plan for administration of Iraq as 
"sketchy" in contrast to robust military plans). 
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population was willing to forgive other shortcomings of a government 
that could deliver security and basic governmental services. 108 If the 
U.S.-led occupation had produced an Iraq without Saddam Hussein, 
with the same levels of electricity, public order, and employment as 
Saddam Hussein provided, then it would have enjoyed a base level of 
internal legitimacy on which to build, permitting construction of the 
institutions of liberal democracy. However, this did not happen. Things 
got worse much worse for ordinary Iraqis after the U.S. military 
occupied Iraq. 109 Any increment of internal legitimacy attributable to 
more effective government is yet to be seen-if it ever can be achieved, 
given the poor start. 
2. Promote Governmental Transparency 
As Political Trusteeship points out, any trusteeship inherently 
creates confusion about what the law is, who is in charge, and where to 
go to resolve uncertainties or disputes. Transparency of the trusteeship 
mitigates the confusion.110 The Iraq Emergency Supplemental 
Appropriation Act recognizes the need for transparency in certain 
activities of the CPA by requiring that reports be posted on the 
Internet. 111 
The U.S.-led political trusteeship in Iraq gets mixed marks on 
transparency. To its credit, the CPA, unlike its Reconstruction 
Authority predecessor under General Gamer, had a website, including 
the full text of regulations and orders issued by the Administrator of the 
CP A. 112 On the other hand, as Part II.A explains, the legal framework 
for the CPA was vague and the content of the CPA website did not 
answer important questions about the chain of command for CPA 
decisions. 113 Also, even as the CPA made a point of transferring more 
108. Political Trusteeship, supra note 1. 
109. JABAR, supra note 104 (reporting on complete breakdown in law and order and in 
functioning of infrastructure after U.S. led invasion). 
110. Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 444-45. 
111. The Act requires that certain reports be posted on the CPA website. See Iraq 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act § 2215(a)(3), Stat. at 1232 (oil production 
reports); Iraq Emergency Supplemental Appropriation§ 3001(i)(4), Stat. at 1237 (quarterly 
Inspector General reports to Congress), available at 
http://www.export.gov/iraq/pdf/public_law_l08-
116.pdf?dbname=108_cong_public_laws&docid=f:pub1106.108.pdf (last visited June 24, 
2004). 
112. See Coalitional Provisional Authority, at http://www.cpa-iraq.org (last visited 
June 24, 2004). 
113. The website has links for "Documents," "Pillars," and "Links" but none of those 
leads to any primary or secondary source that explains the sources of CPA authority. 
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authority to the Governing Council, the Governing Council was 
completely non-transparent, with no website of its own, or even a link 
from the CPA website as of the end of 2003. 114 The Interim Iraqi 
Government had no website nearly six months after its creation. 
3. Provide Mechanisms for Judicial Review 
When any authority makes governmental decisions, international 
legitimacy will be impaired unless those affected by the decisions have 
some place they can go to test the legality of the decisions. As Political 
Trusteeship points out, the international community insists on rule of 
law in countries attracting international attention. 115 Any prescription 
for rule of law starts with the opportunity for judicial review of 
governmental decisions. To earn internal legitimacy for a political 
trusteeship justified in any part by the need to establish a rule of law, the 
political trustee must provide some mechanism for judicial review. 
The Iraq Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act provides for 
an independent Inspector General with limited oversight 
responsibilities, but otherwise neither the U.S. nor the Interim Iraqi 
Government has done anything to afford tribunals within which the 
legality of trustee decisions can be tested. 116 It is not inconceivable that 
someone could file a civil action in a United States District Court 
seeking review under the U. S. Administrative Procedure Act of 
decisions by some component of the CP A. 117 Litigating the merits of 
CPA decisions in this context is surely inferior to litigating them in 
some specialized tribunal which might be established by the CPA. 
114. After the June, 2004 transfer of power, the CPA website had links to information 
on the "new sovereign Iraq" on the U.S. Embassy in Iraq website, http://iraq.usembassy.gov. 
That website, however, contains nothing concrete on the structure or authority of the new 
Iraqi government, and has no link to a website for the new government. See 
http://iraq.usembassy.gov/iraq/addition_links.html (last visited July 8, 2004). 
115. Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 445. 
116. The Act establishes an Inspector General of the Coalition Provisional Authority, 
appointed by the Secretary of Defense, who must report to the Congress on the use of 
appropriated funds and monitor and review reconstruction activities. Iraq Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriation Act, supra note 111, § 3001, Stat. at 1234-35. The Inspector 
General also has the same duties and responsibilities as other inspectors general under the 
Inspector General Act of 1978. Id. § 3001 (f)(2), Stat. at 1236. The Inspector General must 
report quarterly to the Congress on the activities of the CPA. Id. § 3001(i), Stat. at 1237. 
11 7. This author presented this possibility in a question in his final examination to a 
class in Administrative Law in the Spring of 2003. The exam answers suggested the 
possibilities. 
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4. Promote Popular Confidence in Local Institutions 
As political trusteeships are justified by their goal of preparing 
local populations for self-government, their internal legitimacy, is 
measured in part by their success in establishing local institutions that 
themselves enjoy local legitimacy. The record of the U.S.-installed 
institutions of local government is weak in terms of local legitimacy. 
Although the Governing Council was carefully balanced by ethnicity 
and religion, it comprised individuals with weak support in local 
constituencies. The institutions' reputation for being puppets of the 
United States is warranted. At the end of November 2003, there was no 
apparent plan for shoring up the legitimacy of local institutions except 
for vague hopes that legitimate leaders would somehow "emerge." A 
year later, it was not clear that the Interim Iraqi Government was fairing 
much better. 
5. Respect Indigenous Personal and Group Pride 
Internal legitimacy of government institutions in any society is 
determined in large part by the attitudes of opinion leaders. These elites 
lead institutions that form part of the social fabric of the local society. 
Affronts to the pride of such leaders and affronts to the dignity of 
individuals make support from these sources less likely. 
Aggressive tactics by U.S forces in Iraq, while appropriate to 
gather intelligence and to combat terrorist cells, are inevitably imprecise 
and regularly offend local sensibilities. Any foreign military force faces 
obstacles because occupation is an affront to local aspirations for 
autonomy. 
Although some commanders have avoided psychological assaults 
on local customs and mores, the U.S.-led occupation oflraq began with 
a public and explicit indifference to these issues. It was slow and 
ineffective to shape trustee behavior needed to enlist support based on 
local pride, rather than undermining it. 
6. Implement Structures Compatible with Common Ideology 
As Political Trusteeship explains, ideology is a powerful source of 
legitimacy. 118 This is especially true in states where Islam predominates 
because Islamic doctrine integrates religion and politics. 119 Antagonism 
118. Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 452. See generally IDEAS & FOREIGN 
POLICY: BELIEFS, INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL CHANGE (Judith Godstein & Robert 0. 
Keohane, eds. , 1993) (arguing that ideology plays a role, and challenging purely rationalist 
approached to international relations theory). 
119. HAIFA ALANGARI, THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER IN ARABIA 176 (1998) [hereinafter 
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against an outside force also can be a potent ideology. 120 In Iraq and 
other parts of the Arab world, Islamic fundamentalism combines with 
anti-Westernism, as religious leaders blame Western imperialism and 
cultural influences for humiliation suffered by the Muslim World. 121 
As Part 11.B § 7 explains, disagreements over the role that Islam 
should play in a new Iraqi Constitution frustrated early efforts to write a 
constitution. 122 Columnist Thomas Friedman argues that the struggle 
over the future of Iraq is fundamentally a struggle between anti-
American elements who seek to portray the U.S. as anti-Muslim and the 
United States. The United States is a country whose credibility in this 
struggle is greatly impaired because President Bush lets "one of [his] 
top generals and [his] pals on the Christian right spew hate against the 
Prophet Muhammad," which strengthened the will of young anti-
Americans. 123 
7. Nurture Charismatic Leadership 
Charismatic leadership enhances internal and international 
legitimacy. 124 The political trusteeship in Iraq has so far failed to enlist a 
charismatic local leader in support of its enterprise. Ahmad Chalabi is, 
by some accounts charismatic but he is not really "local" having lived in 
exile since 1956.125 Prime Minister Iyad Allawi projects a tough 
demeanor, which appeals to many Iraqi's, but his political closeness to 
the Bush Administration undermines his local support. 
Other possibilities existed at the end of the military campaign. One 
of the most promising candidates while under protection of U.S. forces, 
the very charismatic and pro-U.S. Ayatollah Abdul Majid Al Khoei, 
was assassinated on April 10, 2003 in Najaf. 126 Others now include 
"Alangari"] (describing how lbn Saud used Wahhabism, a fundamentalist Muslim revivalist 
movement, to consolidate his political power, and to overcome the limits of coercion as a 
means of controlling tribal rivalries). 
120. "It is a universal political maxim that the absence of a common antagonist focuses 
aggression inward and splits the society." Id. at 27. 
121. BERNARD LEWIS, WHAT WENT WRONG? WESTERN IMPACT AND MIDDLE EASTERN 
RESPONSE 158 (2002) (describing movement that "attribute[es] all evil to the abandonment 
of the divine heritage of Islam"). 
122. JABAR, supra note 104 (describing how inter-ethnic and inter-religious 
factionalism undercut effort to write constitution). 
123. Thomas L. Friedman, Letter From Tikrit, N.Y.TIMES, Nov. 27, 2003. 
124. See supra Part 11.B.6 (evaluating charisma as source of international legitimacy). 
125. See supra Part 11.B.6 (describing conflicting perceptions of Chalabi). 
126. Leela Jacinto, Murder in the Mosque, U.S. at a Loss After Killing of Senior Iraqi 
Shiite Cleric, ABC News (Apr. 14, 2003), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/Primetime/iraq_shia030414.html (last visited June 24, 
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moderates such as Ayatollah Al-Sistani, who derailed late October U.S. 
plans for installing a transitional local government without elections, 
and "radicals" like Muqtada Al-Sadr, who is in his 30s, who is popular 
among the country's poor and its youth. So far, the U.S. has made little 
headway in attracting Al Sadr's support. 127 He calls for his followers to 
resist the U.S. occupation. 128 Still other possible candidates are Massoud 
Barzani or Jalil Talabani, competing Kurdish leaders. Yet, it is hard to 
imagine that the majority Shiites or the Sunnis would accept Kurdish 
leadership. Further, these two have a history of putting more effort into 
fighting each other than cooperating in a common enterprise. 
8. Bring an End to National-Stage Conflicts 
In some cases of international intervention, such as Bosnia, 
Kosovo and East Timor, the original justification for establishing a 
political trusteeship was to end internal violence. 129 In such cases, 
success in ending these national conflicts links directly to the raison 
d'etre for the trusteeship and produces internal, as well as international, 
legitimacy Y 0 In other cases, such as Iraq, factors other than intra-state 
violence justified the intervention, but post-intervention internal conflict 
can easily undermine internal legitimacy. Iraq is a good example of this 
process at work. There is support for the U.S.-led political trusteeship 
has eroded in the face of early looting, food and electricity shortages, 
and in the absence of any demonstrated capacity for self-government by 
the U.S.-picked Iraqi Governing Council, or its successor Interim 
Government. Bold constitutional solutions, such as a three-state 
approach suggested by former President of the Council of Foreign 
Relations Leslie Gelb, have not been taken up by the Bush 
Administration. 131 
D. Failure to Build Liberal Democracy 
Political Trusteeship argues that political trustees achieve their 
objectives in the long term only if they build liberal democracy by 
designing institutional structures to manage internal political 
2004). 
127. See Fareed Zakaria, Our Last Real Chance, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 19, 2004, at 44. 
(describing activities of Sistani and al-Sadr, and U.S. failure to enlist their support). 
128. Id.( describing al-Sadr's opposition to U.S. occupation). 
129. Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 398---404. (describing bases for 
international intervention in Bosnia, Kosovo and East Timor). 
130. See supra Part Il.B.7 (discussing ending national-stage conflicts as a source of 
international legitimacy). 
131. See Political Trusteeship, supra note I. 
32
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2004], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol31/iss2/2
2004] Iraq and the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy 181 
competition. 132 This is accomplished by drawing on unique local 
experiences, by recruiting and developing appropriate leadership elites, 
by defining and implementing strategies for economic development and 
by not letting corruption dominate their agenda. 133 Meeting these 
objectives supports an exit strategy premised on the trustee turning over 
more and more responsibility for governance to local institutions that 
are viable politically and economically and which respect democratic 
and human rights values. 
A liberal democracy in Iraq is an explicit goal of the U.S.-led 
intervention. About a month into the U.S.-led war to remove Saddam 
Hussein, National Security Advisor Rice identified rule of law and 
democracy as important goals. 134 President Bush, in late 2003, talked of 
democracy as a goal of the political trusteeship in Iraq, identifying the 
elements · of liberal democracy .135 
The Bush Administration recognizes at some level of abstraction 
the need to build institutions of liberal democracy, but it has so far 
grossly overestimated the ease of doing so. The Administration 
recognizes the need to build political structures for managing internal 
conflict. It has sought to avoid democratic elections before the 
mediating institutions of a liberal democracy sprout. It has been 
132. Id. 
133. See generally Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992). 
134. "Our goals are clear: We will help Iraqis build an Iraq ... that respect[s] the rights 
of Iraqi people and the rule of law; and that is on the path to democracy." Press Briefing, 
supra note 67. 
135. "In Iraq, the Coalition Provisional Authority and the Iraqi Governing Council are 
also working together to build a democracy." President George W. Bush, Remarks at the 
201h Anniversary of the National Endowment for Democracy (Nov. 6, 2003), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/ 11/20031106-3 .html (last visited June 24, 
2004 ). "The failure of Iraqi democracy would embolden terrorists around the world, 
increase dangers to the American people, and extinguish the hopes of millions in the region. 
Iraqi democracy will succeed-and that success will send forth the news, from Damascus to 
Teheran-that freedom can be the future of every nation." Id. "There are, however, essential 
principles common to every successful society, in every culture. Successful societies limit 
the power of the state and the power of the military-so that governments respond to the 
will of the people, and not the will of an elite. Successful societies protect freedom with the 
consistent and impartial rule of law, instead of selecting applying-selectively applying the 
law to punish political opponents. Successful societies allow room for healthy civic 
institutions-for political parties and labor unions and independent newspapers and 
broadcast media. Successful societies guarantee religious liberty-the right to serve and 
honor God without fear of persecution. Successful societies privatize their economies, and 
secure the rights of property. They prohibit and punish official corruption, and invest in the 
health and education of their people. They recognize the rights of women. And instead of 
directing hatred and resentment against others, successful societies appeal to the hopes of 
their own people." Id. 
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deliberate in its effort to identify appropriate local and external elites. 
Abandoning a foolish early myth that the occupation army would 
be uniformly embraced, it came to recognize by late October that 
intolerance for the occupying forces was high and building. Ultimately, 
any sound exit strategy needs to result in a turnover of governmental 
power before legitimacy of the trustee breaks down completely. In other 
words, the necessity for a coherent and practicable exit strategy, 
considered in Part 11.E, collides with the goal of developing a liberal 
democracy. 136 Working under increasing time pressure, the Bush 
Administration formulated reasonably coherent concepts for evolving 
the initial Interim Governing Council into a more effective and more 
representative Iraqi interim government. 137 The goal was to improve 
representation, while at the same time deferring popular elections until 
more progress had been made on erecting mediating institutions. 
Often the implementation of the prescriptions was flawed and 
naive, or driven by ideology or cronyism. This should not obscure the 
reality that many of the basic policy pillars were sound. 
1. Design Institutional Structures to Manage Internal Political 
Competition, Drawing on Unique Local Experiences 
Liberal democracy signifies, among other things, the capacity of 
democratic political institutions to manage inter-group conflict. The 
challenge is greater when ethnic and religious differences reinforce 
mere political differences. The test of viable democracy is not only a 
willingness to compete for political power through established 
institutions, but also to be willing to lose without organizing a coup or 
starting a civil war. 
The United States feared that Shiite dominance of any popularly 
elected Iraqi government would suppress Sunni and other minority 
elements, possibly leading to a rebellion of Sunnis against a new Iraqi 
government. 138 The U.S. sought to reduce this possibility by writing a 
constitution to protect minority rights before elections were held by 
transferring significant power to a new local government. 139 The plan 
was abandoned in light of worsening security and growing calls for an 
136. Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 467-71. (explaining how exit strategy 
must be coordinated with development of institutions of liberal democracy, lest opposition 
to continued trusteeship force premature withdrawal). 
137. See ]ABAR, supra note 104, at 8-10. (describing establishment of Governing 
Council and its ethnic balance). 
138. Id. (describing U.S. concerns about Shiite dominance). 
139. Id. (describing efforts to broker a constitution). 
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early transfer of power. 140 The new plan called for the Iraqi Governing 
Council and local governments to choose a "transitional assembly," 
comprising several hundred Iraqis representing geographical and social 
sectors.141 That assembly would have established an "interim 
government," which would write a constitution in June 2004.142 
The plan unraveled when Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a 
powerful Shiite cleric, insisted on direct elections of representatives to 
write a constitution. 143 The U.S. believed that direct national elections 
could not be held without voter rolls, which could not be constructed 
without a census. 144 The U.N. had proposed using a food-rations 
registry to qualify voters, but Saddam Hussein had used the registry to 
reward his supporters and punish his enemies. At the end of November, 
the U.S. explored the possibility that a system of provincial and local 
elections, town meetings and causes of civil leaders might meet the 
Grand Ayatollah's demands. 145 In addition, the Governing Council 
backed away from its original agreement that it would be dissolved 
when the transitional assembly was selected, instead remaining to 
function as a kind of legislative senate. 146 Working out a plan was 
complicated by the perception, expressed both by Shiite members of the 
Governing Council and by Ahmad Chalabi, that "the whole thing was 
set up so President Bush could come to the airport in October for a 
ceremony to congratulate the new Iraqi government," thus supporting 
his bid for reelection. 147 
2. Recruit Leadership Elites from Outside and Inside the Trust 
Territory 
Liberal democracy requires political elites who can provide 
leadership to competing parties and factions while respecting the norms 
of democracy and a rule of law. The Bush Administration apparently 
140. Steven R. Weisman, Sensing Shiites Will Rule Iraq, U.S. Starts to See Friends, 
Not Foes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2003. 
141. JABAR, supra note 104, at 10-11. (describing U.S. approach and Sistani's 
opposition). 
142. Joel Brinkley and Ian Fisher, U.S. Plan in Iraq to Shift Control Hits Major Snag, 
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 27, 2003, at 1 [hereinafter Brinkley & Fisher]. 
143. The Grand Ayatollah enjoyed an effective veto on plans for governmental 
transformation because of his influence with the 12 Shiite members of the 24-member 
Governing Council. Brinkley & Fisher, supra note 142. 
144. JABAR, supra note 104, at 16. (concluding that free and fair elections are not 
possible without accurate voter rolls). 
145. Brinkley & Fisher, supra note 142. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. 
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envisioned, not early democratic elections, but spontaneous 
"emergence" in Iraq of representative leadership. 148 
Any political trustee inherits a reality in which the interaction of 
political elites has gone awry. Accordingly, one of the essential 
responsibilities of a political trustee is to vet those aspiring to leadership 
positions, and to recruit elites for under-represented groups. Early post-
war initiatives in Iraq reflected pursuit of both responsibilities. The 
administrator of the CPA issued an order banning senior Baath Party 
members from employment with the government or with public 
institutions. 149 Some ministers in the interim government were exiles, 
who spent years "polishing a plan to de-Baathify Iraq once Saddam 
Hussein was gone."150 
Eliminating Baath Party members from leadership positions proved 
difficult. 151 In some cases, local Iraqi leaders and their American Army 
counterparts have been reluctant to remove Party members because 
"throwing people of authority and expertise onto the street" would fuel 
resistance to the occupation. 152 In other cases, they cannot be identified 
because they altered databases and other records to conceal their Baath 
Party involvement. 153 In many cases, their expertise is needed to run the 
country and its institutions. At first, the Bush Administration sought to 
reduce likely Shiite dominance of any elected Iraqi government, but 
gradually accommodated itself to the reality that Shiites would likely 
govern Iraq, reconciling them to this inevitability by realizing that the 
Shiite movement is not monolithic and would not necessarily be 
influenced by outside forces in Iran and elsewhere. 154 
148. "When you get rid of the reign of fear that Saddam Hussein has wreaked on 
people who hold their communities together, you're going to see leadership emerge. "And 
so it's not as if somebody is picking these people; these people are emerging from Iraq. Just 
as in the exile community, these are people who have emerged because they have fought the 
long fight and they ought to be a part of Iraq's future. "Ultimately, there will have to be a 
process of elections and all of the things that go with democracy, that will finally affirm 
what the actual government of Iraq will be. But in this interim stage, there's no reason to 
believe that the Iraqis cannot help-cannot identify the people who will be a part of the 
interim Iraqi [administration]." Press Briefing, supra note 67. 
149. Coalition of Provisional Authority Order No. 1, at 
http://www.iraqcoalition.org/regulations/20030516_CPAORD_l_De-
Ba_athification_of_Iraqi_Society_. pdf (last visited June 24, 2004 ). 
150. Susan Sachs, Baathists, Once Reviled, Prove Difficult to Remove, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 22, 2003, at A7. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. 
153. Id. 
154. Weisman, supra note 140. 
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3. Define and Implement Strategies for Economic Development 
Political trustees cannot achieve their political and security 
objectives unless they pay as much attention to building a sustainable 
economy in the trust territory as they do to human rights, rule of law, 
and constitution writing. Declining standards of living and frustrated 
aspirations for economic advancement are powerful sources of political 
instability. In Iraq, the U.S.-led occupation recognized the importance 
of economic development, but was unable, for its first eighteen months, 
to link its plans for reconstruction and reform of the Iraqi economy with 
establishment of basic law and order and the rebuilding of the local 
institutional apparatus necessary to allow private sector initiative to 
succeed. 
The political trustee in Iraq gave appropriate prominence to 
economic development. On the top level of the CPA website was an 
"Economy" button, which branched into foreign investment, financial 
market construction, transparency in accounting, public sector finance, 
private sector development, strengthening science and technology, 
public sector management reform, and private bank information.155 
These categories should receive attention early in any political 
trusteeship, along with development of appropriate macro-economic 
policies and infrastructure. 
A separate Iraqi Business Center website, linked to from the top 
page of the CPA website, offers assistance to foreigners and Iraqis 
seeking to start or to maintain businesses, including information on 
opportunities in agriculture, construction, manufacturing, information 
technology, oil services and tourism. 156 Little useful information is 
provided on the site. The sole content of the tourism page is a document 
containing two short paragraphs suggesting that "[a] tourist project 
suggested to be buildup in north of Iraq, which has the perfect means of 
such project, especially that the North is almost missing for such kind of 
modem and new style of projects."157 The website provides for online 
155. The content of the web pages associated with these categories is sparse, however, 
mostly reporting on CPA philosophy and aspirations. As of Nov. 30 2003, the only factual 
and documentary content was a link to the CPA foreign investment law, to the two national 
budgets, and to telephone contact information for more than a dozen private banks. 
Coalition Provisional Authority, at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/economy.html (last visited June 
24, 2004). 
156. See generally Business Center, available at 
http://iraqcoalition.org/business_center.html (last visited July 8, 2004). 
157. Tourism Village or Hotel, at 
http: //iraqibusinesscenter.org/Private_sector/lraqu2outsiders/Tourism/TOURIST%20VI 
LLAGE%200R%20HOTEL.doc (last visited Mar. 30, 2004). 
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business registration, which is a desirable feature. 158 The Business 
Center website links to a separate U.S. Department of Commerce 
website, which provides a digest of applicable law in Iraq, an up-to-date 
summary of business conditions in Iraq and answers frequently asked 
questions. 159 
In November 2003, the U.S. arm of the International Chamber of 
Commerce-the United States Council for International Business 
(USCIB)-worked with the Iraqi-American Chamber of Commerce and 
Industry and the International Chamber of Commerce ("ICC"), the 
world business organization. Together the organizations worked to 
improve enforceable resolution of business disputes relating to Iraq and 
otherwise to improve the legal and security situation for business.160 
The Iraqi-American Chamber of Commerce and Industry has a website 
that includes surveys and news stories about business conditions in Iraq 
and a link to neoconservative views about American foreign policy. 161 
According to an August 2003 survey of 600 businesses in Iraq, the 
principal barriers to economic progress were lack of modem economic 
laws, legal uncertainty, insufficient access to credit, and unreliable 
electricity. 162 The survey revealed that a significant majority of 
respondents expected conditions for business to improve. 163 It is not 
clear what affect the growing levels of terrorist violence after August, 
2003 had on these perceptions.164 
The economic initiatives in Iraq represent a model for how to 
provide information on business opportunities during a political 
trusteeship. Unfortunately, failure of other aspects of the political 
trusteeship in Iraq, accompanied by continuing threats of terrorist 
attacks on foreigners, frustrates implementation of plans for private-
sector-oriented economic development. 
158. Id. 
159. Iraq Investment and Reconstruction Task Force, at http://www.export.gov/iraq 
(last visited June 24, 2004). The summary provides information on such practical issues as 
local security firms, telephone service, visas, border entry points, and means of transporting 
goods into and out of the country. Id. 
160. Getting back to business in Iraq, at 
http://www.iccwbo.org/home/news_archives/2003/stories/iraq_chamber.asp (last visited 
June 24, 2004). 
161. Iraqi American Chamber of Commerce and Industry, at http://i-acci.org/ (last 
visited June 24, 2004). 
162. Conditions and Expectations for Private Enterprise in Iraq, at 
http://www.cipe.org/pdf/iraq_survey _final.pdf (last visited June 24, 2004 ). 
163. See Reporting Corruption, at www.iraqbusinesscenter.org. (last visited July 8, 
2004). 
164. Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 467. 
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4. Do not let Corruption Dominate the Agenda 
Successful political trusteeship requires simultaneous effort and 
progress on a variety of political, legal and economic fronts. Public and 
private-sector corruption is a fact of life in all parts of the world. While 
any political trustee must seek to reduce corruption as part of its effort 
to build a liberal democracy and to establish conditions for private 
markets to function effectively, it must not let fear of corruption hold 
back progress. 
The U.S.-led political trustees in Iraq apparently have the balance 
about right. Blockages of political and economic development have 
resulted from security threats and political deadlock or uncertainty, but 
anti-corruption efforts are operating parallel with other initiatives. The 
Iraqi Business Center website contains a button on its top page for 
reporting corruption. 165 The instructions appropriately distinguish 
between concrete reports of solicitation of bribes or kickbacks, payment 
of bribes, or threats from competitors from rumors or complaints about 
unsuccessful bids. 166 Its scope is confined to corruption in the public 
tender process, and does not accommodate complaints of corruption in 
regulation of business or delivery of public services. 
E. Failure to Define a Coherent Exit Strategy 
Political Trusteeship argues that successful political trusteeship 
requires defining a coherent exit strategy that permits the trustee to 
leave before local resentment overwhelms its international legitimacy, 
but after the seeds of a liberal democrac~ have been planted so they are 
likely to grow after the trustee leaves. 67 Abandoning an absurd early 
myth that the occupation army would be uniformly embraced, the Bush 
Administration came to recognize by late October 2003 that it had no 
real exit strategy, and needed to develop one quickly. 168 Intolerance for 
the occupying forces was high and growing. The U.S. needed to find a 
way to tum over governmental power before legitimacy of the trustee 
broke down completely. 
Working under this time pressure, the U.S. formulated reasonably 
coherent concepts for evolving the initial Interim Authority into a more 
165. Iraqi Business Center, at http://iraqibusinesscenter.org/ (last visited July 8, 2004). 
166. Political Trusteeship, supra note 1, at 467. 
167. Michale Hirsh, Racing the Clock in Iraq, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 9, 2004, at 32, 35. 
(noting that Bremer had to retreat from earlier plan and agree to earlier transfer of 
sovereignty). 
168. JABAR, supra note 104, at 10-11. (reporting concerns of and opposition by Shiite 
constituencies). 
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effective and more representative Iraqi interim government, and 
explored a variety of ways in which to improve representation, while at 
the same time deferring popular elections until more progress had been 
made on erecting mediating institutions. Failure to deal effectively with 
Shiite ambitions for a share of power commensurate with Shiite 
numbers made the reformulated U.S. plan dead-on-arrival. 169 
The outlines of an exit strategy for political trusteeship in Iraq are 
difficult to bring into focus because the course of local development is 
so difficult to predict. While it is relatively easy to define various 
scenarios for U.S. withdrawal, most of the obvious scenarios are deeply 
unsatisfactory and would represent a failure of the intervention. For 
example, goaded by Presidential election campaign politics, the Bush 
Administration may have moved prematurely to tum over power to a 
shaky Interim Iraqi Government in June 2004. 170 Political conditions in 
Iraq are such that American withdrawal likely would be followed by 
chaos or by establishment of a militant, anti-American Islamic regime, 
influenced by Iran or by al Qaeda. It is far from clear what other 
scenarios could produce both liberal democracy and an early American 
exit. 
1. Expect Post-Conflict Euphoria to Turn into Resentment of the 
Trustee 
Political trustees, like any occupying force, become unpopular. If a 
trustee has built substantial stores of internal legitimacy, it may enjoy a 
longer period of popularity. Eventually, the trust people will resent any 
power retained in trustee hands and insist that the trustee tum over all 
remaining power to locally accountable institutions. 
This happened much sooner in Iraq than in other recent political 
trusteeships. President Bush responded directly to the pressure for the 
U.S. to leave Iraq when he modified the timetable for the CPA in late 
October 2003. 171 The early resentment of the U.S. occupation came as a 
surprise to the Administration but could have been predicted by the poor 
performance of the occupation in terms of almost all of the indicia of 
internal legitimacy. 
169. See Will Dunham, Americans Squirm at U.S. Death Toll in Iraq Surges, Apr. 20, 
2004, at http://www.veteransforpeace.org/Americans_squirm_042003.htm (last visited July 
8, 2004). (noting that Bush administration may choose to escalate or it may choose to 
declare 'victory' and go home). 
170. JABAR, supra note 104, at 11-12. (reporting shift in timetable under White House 
political pressure). 
171. Id. at 3-5. (describing uncertainty and shifting policies of Garner and Bremer). 
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2. Clearly Define Triggers for Devolution to Local Institutions 
The ultimate challenge for any political trustee is to implement a 
coherent program of phased withdrawal, linking each major phase to 
achievement of explicit benchmarks tied to establishment of a liberal 
democracy. Premature withdrawal results in failure because conditions 
in the trust territory will revert to a state of affairs as bad as, or worse 
than, those that justified the international intervention in the first place. 
Deferring withdrawal too long will result in a progressive loss of control 
by the political trustee as local opposition grows, eventually 
accompanied by violence. 
Since the United States never clearly defined the mandate or 
structure of its political trusteeship in Iraq and failed to meet the criteria 
for internal legitimacy, it has had difficulty in articulating a consistent, 
clear exit strategy. During the war, it was not clear what the U.S. 
intended after Saddam Hussein was deposed: a U.S.-run trusteeship? 
U.N.-led civilian administration? Immediate handover to Iraqi exiles? 
After President Bush declared the military phase of the occupation over, 
reconstruction administrator Jay Garner sought rapid delegation of civil 
authority to exiles, accompanied by immediate elections. 172 After the 
Administration displaced Garner with J. Paul Bremer, Bremer reversed 
course and announced a more deliberate process of transferring power, 
with elections and constitution-writing coming earlier. 173 Then, in 
October 2003 the Administration scrapped that plan, and declared that 
power would be transferred to a transitional government selected 
through a vaguely defined community-based political process. The 
thought is that local leaders would be identified and acquire legitimacy 
spontaneously. 174 Within a month, it was clear that the plan was 
unworkable, and the Administration struggled to come up with another. 
Unless the U.S. pursues the irresponsible course of withdrawing 
unilaterally from Iraq, regardless of progress toward constructing a 
stable local government with the institutions that could lead to a liberal 
democracy, it should have defined clear and practicable benchmarks for 
devolving power to local institutions. For such benchmarks to work, 
they must be developed in consultation with major Iraqi political 
interests. For its trusteeship to be successful, the U.S. must have the 
political discipline to stick with its benchmarks, regardless of the 
temptation to withdraw. Premature withdrawal will mark the 
172. JABAR, supra note 104, at 3-5. 
173. Id. 
174. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
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intervention and the political trusteeship as dramatic failures. The 
success of the Interim Government, to which sovereignty was 
transferred without conditions on June 28, 2004, will determine whether 
the handover on that date was premature. 
III. IMPACT ON U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 
Two distinct questions exist about the impact of the Iraq invasion 
on American foreign policy. First, what is the impact of the new 
national security strategy exemplified by the Iraq invasion, assuming 
that the result of the invasion is to encourage the United States to pursue 
the strategy? Second, what effect will it have if America "fails" in Iraq, 
undercutting the credibility of its commitment to the strategy? 
Assessing the impact of the Iraq war on American foreign policy 
requires articulating some basic tenets of U.S. policy with respect to 
which impact can be judged. Such tenets should be framed so as not to 
make the assessment tautological; the set of foreign policy tenets should 
be broad enough to encompass two basic scenarios comfortably. The 
first assumes that recently-reelected George Bush continues to pursue 
the Bush Doctrine. The assessment would ask what the Iraq experience 
portends with respect to the pursuit of the Bush Doctrine. The second 
scenario assumes that the Democrats return to power in 2008, and 
articulate fundamental changes in foreign policy. The assessment would 
ask how the Iraq experience will shape and constrain that significantly 
different foreign policy direction. 
The following sections present basic tenets of U. S. foreign policy, 
explain the logic that led to adoption of the Bush Doctrine and the 
decision to invade Iraq. These sections argue that the Iraqi invasion 
undercuts U.S. foreign policy objectives because: the U.S.-led invasion 
failed to harness international legitimacy and failed to achieve internal 
legitimacy. The absence of legitimacy shows every sign of frustrating 
the goal of developing stable democratic institutions before the U.S. is 
forced into a premature exit. At best the Iraq intervention reveals the 
serious shortcomings of a U.S. foreign policy premised on unilateralism 
and overemphasizes use of military power focused on states. At worst, 
the Iraq intervention will undercut the credibility of the U.S. to project 
its power in support of its national interests particularly to reduce the 
threat of terrorism. 
This part concludes with two sections, one arguing that any 
alternative to the Bush Doctrine must have the potential to attract at 
least as much mass public support. The second section suggests that 
part of any alternative should embrace the opportunity to use a 
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redesigned Peace Corps to extend American inspiration, even as the Iraq 
intervention plays itself out. 
A. Tenets of US. foreign policy 
1. Goals 
At a sufficiently high level of abstraction, broad agreement exists 
across the ideological spectrum and through time on three basic goals 
for U. S. foreign policy: 
Keep America secure. Every foreign policy maker and national 
security strategist agrees that one of the goals of U.S. foreign policy is 
to keep America secure from foreign attack on its territory and against 
its citizens and assets abroad. 175 
Keep America prosperous. U.S. foreign policy consistently seeks 
to promote American prosperity by opening up new markets for 
American goods and services, protecting American private investment 
abroad, and ensuring access by U.S. firms to the factors of production, 
including foreign investment, foreign labor, and foreign raw 
materials. 176 
Project the American vision. Although some realist theorists in 
international relations disdain this goal, broad agreement exists that a 
goal of U.S. foreign policy is to transform the rest of the world, whether 
that means ending the slave trade 160 years ago, or more generally to 
promote human rights, and democracy in the 21st Century .177 
2. Means 
Agreement is narrower on the means that should be used to pursue 
U.S. foreign policy goals. Nevertheless there is agreement across the 
ideological spectrum on the basic tools available. 
Deterrence. There is broad agreement that deterrence, in the form 
of a threat of nuclear retaliation for a nuclear attack or of overwhelming 
175. NSS document, supra note 47. 
176. Compare id. at 1-2 ("ignite a new era of global economic growth through free 
markets and free trade; expand the circle of development by opening societies and building 
the infrastructure of democracy") with Samuel R. Berger, A Foreign Policy for the Global 
Age, 79 FOR. AFF. 22, 32 (2000). ("Economic integration advances both our interests and 
our values but also accentuates the need to alleviate economic disparities"). 
177. Compare NSS document, supra note 47, at 1-2 ("champion aspirations for 
human dignity") and NSS document at 1-2 ("Our goals on the path to progress are clear: 
political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other states, and respect for human 
dignity") with Berger, supra note 176, at 38. (arguing that the U.S. cannot protect its 
interests by diminishing its role in the world or by imposing its will). 
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conventional military response to direct attacks on American assets, 
plays an important role in defending the U.S. against physical attack. 
There is disagreement over the priority to be given deterrence in the 
future, with arguments over the degree to which deterrence can continue 
to be effective against rogue nations or non-state actors, and the degree 
to which the emphasis should shift from deterrence to prevention and 
interdiction. 178 
Prevention/interdiction. Historically, the United States has used 
military, intelligence and economic power to reach out and remove 
threats to its interests. Plots to assassinate Castro during the Kennedy 
administration, interventions in Viet Nam and elsewhere during the 
Cold War to prevent the "domino effect" from spreading Soviet and 
Chinese power, missile attacks on targets in Afghanistan and Sudan 
during the Clinton Administration were all examples. Much of the 
debate over the Bush Doctrine concerns the degree to which the United 
States should rely on this means of foreign policy, as well as the 
circumstances and scale of its use. 179 
Cooperation . A central characteristic of U.S. foreign policy after 
the Second World War was its pursuit of foreign policy goals through 
formal cooperation with other states. The United States led the effort to 
construct the United Nations, the World Trade Organization ("WTO") 
and NATO, believing that it could realize its interests through a rule of 
international law, and that the cost-constraining its own power to act 
unilaterally-was worth paying. Much of the battle between the Bush 
Administration and its critics is fought over the degree to which the 
United States should continue to prefer such permanent international 
legal structures. There is agreement on the appropriateness of some 
178. The Bush Administration believed that deterrence was insufficient to forestall the 
possibility of use of weapons of mass destruction by Saddam Hussein and thus that it was 
necessary to remove him from power to remove the threat. Compare NSS document, supra 
note 47, at 1-2 ("transform America's national security institutions to meet the challenges 
and opportunities of the twenty-first century") with Berger, supra note 176, at 30. ("New 
dangers, accentuated by technological advances and the permeability of borders, require 
new national security priorities"). 
179. Compare NSS document, supra note 47, at 1-2 ("transform America's national 
security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century") 
with Berger at 30 ("New dangers, accentuated by technological advances and the 
permeability of borders, require new national security priorities"); compare NSS document, 
supra note 47, at 1-2 ("prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends, 
with weapons of mass destruction") with Berger at 30 ("New dangers, accentuated by 
technological advances and the permeability of borders, require new national security 
priorities"); compare NSS document, supra note 4 7, at 1-2 ("work with others to defuse 
regional conflicts") with Berger at 29 ("Local conflicts can have global consequences") 
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form of cooperation. 180 
Inducement/incentives. U.S. economic power and diplomatic 
influence permit it to use a variety of "carrots" to encourage foreign 
states to change policies or behavior. Inducements include foreign aid, 
lifting of economic sanctions, granting of most-favored-nation status, 
military cooperation linkages, technical assistance in the political, legal 
and economic spheres, and channeling foreign investment. 
Inspiration. The fact is, despite criticism of American cultural 
imperialism, that American culture is widely admired. For many around 
the world, the United States has served and continues to serve as a 
beacon of hope, with respect to human rights, economic success, rule of 
law, democracy, and opportunity for individuals. The rhetoric of 
American foreign policy, whether directed to American audiences or 
foreign audiences, often refers to the power of the American example to 
inspire mass publics and elites around the world. 
B. The Iraq invasion undercuts America's ability to confront new 
realities in foreign affairs 
The Iraq invasion is a dramatic indication of U.S. willingness to 
pursue a new direction in foreign policy: the "Bush Doctrine." The Bush 
Doctrine, responding to the perceived need for a coherent strategy and 
to concerns that significant instability in the world threatens to get 
worse without bold action, signifies a shift in preference from 
deterrence and multilateralism to military interdiction and unilateralism. 
The Doctrine uses inducements and incentives more aggressively and 
extends America's inspirational capacity. 
Unfortunately, the invasion and the Doctrine undercut America's 
ability to accommodate new realities in the international relations 
system. The Doctrine fails to identify the real threats to American 
interests. It fails to recognize that international relations are no longer 
dominated exclusively by states. It avoids new geopolitical 
opportunities. It increases the likelihood of a "Clash of Civilizations." It 
makes fundamental restructuring of America's defense establishment 
less likely. 
180. Compare NSS document, supra note 47, at 1-2 ("strengthen alliances to defeat 
global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends") with Berger, supra 
note , at 25 ("America's alliances with Europe and Asia remain the cornerstone of its 
national security, but they must be constantly adapted to meet emerging challenges"). 
Compare NSS document, supra note 47, at 1-2 ("develop agendas for cooperative action 
with other main centers of global power") with Berger, supra note , at 27 ("Peace and 
security for the United States depend on building principled, constructive, clear-eyed 
relations with our former great-power adversaries"). 
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1. The invasion symbolizes adherence to Bush Doctrine 
As the invasion of Iraq is best understood as the first effort to 
implement the Bush Doctrine, assessing the invasion of Iraq necessarily 
involves assessing the Bush Doctrine. 
(a) Emergence of the Bush Doctrine 
The end of the Cold War left the world without a structure of 
international relations. The first Bush Administration briefly flirted 
with the vague idea of a New World Order. The Clinton Administration 
pursued a policy of selective intervention with an emphasis on the 
development of civil society and human rights, as in Bosnia and 
Kosovo. The second Bush Administration came to office preaching 
disengagement, unilateral pursuit of U.S. interests, suspicion of 
multilateralism, preoccupation with threats from China and Russia and a 
determination to implement an unproven national missile defense 
system. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, in its "war on 
terrorism," the Bush Administration arranged a broad coalition of states 
to assist in responding to the attacks of September 11 through military 
intervention in Afghanistan. Then the Administration announced a new 
national security strategy, which emphasizes military preeminence, 
unilateral military action and questions the utility of treaties and other 
multilateral frameworks. The U.S.-led attack against Iraq for the 
purpose of deposing the Saddam Hussein regime is widely viewed as 
the first clear example of application of the "Bush Doctrine." 
The determination to invade Iraq and the articulation of the Bush 
Doctrine resulted from political and policy making processes that were 
intertwined. The Iraq invasion was the culmination of a logical process. 
The September 11th attacks showed that international relations were 
spinning out of control. The institutions of international security, 
particularly the U.N. and NATO, demonstrated during the conflicts in 
Bosnia and Kosovo, but also to some extent in framing an international 
mandate for military action in Afghanistan after September 11, 
significant limitations of political will which (especially in Bosnia and 
almost in Kosovo) thwarted what the United States believed was 
appropriate and necessary action. In those cases, as in Afghanistan, the 
United States had the power to do what it thought was necessary, and it 
was held back by political constraints. In the case of Bosnia, the U.S. 
believed these restraints lost thousands of lives unnecessarily. 
The U.S. did not fully understand the dynamics of the non-state 
aspects of terrorism, but it knew that states, including Afghanistan, Iran, 
Libya and perhaps Saudi Arabia, encouraged terrorist organizations 
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aimed at other states and provided significant material support to 
terrorist networks. It was likely that terrorist networks would represent 
ever greater threats as their technological capabilities increased, 
especially if they could have weapons of mass destruction at their 
disposal. 
The Bush Administration, frustrated like its predecessors with lack 
of progress in the Middle East and worried about the implications of 
continuing the deadlock between Israel and the Palestinians indefinitely, 
was receptive to ideas for some kind of breakthrough. It began hearing 
from the Jewish Community in the United States that Iraq represented 
an "existential threat" to Israel and was a more important focus for the 
u.s.181 
President Bush wanted a bold foreign policy initiative as a 
response to the attacks of September 11. The Republican foreign policy 
establishment had consistently criticized the Clinton Administration for 
failing to develop a coherent foreign and national-security policy 
strategy to follow the Cold War. The National Security Strategy was 
the strategic result of Bush's push. 
Major elements of the Bush Doctrine are expressed in the National 
Security Strategy, which reflects a stock of intellectual capital 
developed during the 1990s by the Republic foreign policy 
establishment. In 1996, William Kristol and Robert Kagan characterized 
conservatives as "adrift" in foreign policy.182 They argued that a "neo-
Reaganite foreign policy would be good for conservatives, good for 
America and good for the world."183 Such a foreign policy would be 
based on "benevolent hegemony," and would comprise three elements: 
greatly increased defense expenditures aimed at preserving American 
hegemony as long as possible; greater involvement by citizens at large 
in the role of the military and in the national-security enterprise; and 
stronger moral leadership focused on certain American principles for 
governance abroad-democracy, free markets and respect for liberty .184 
During the Presidential campaign of 2000, Condoleezza Rice, later 
to become National Security Adviser in the Bush Administration, 
argued for a "disciplined and consistent foreign policy that separates the 
181. When the author was a Congressional candidate beginning in late 2001, he heard 
this message from Jewish political action groups, when he courted their support. 
182. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, Toward a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy, 75 
FOREIGN AFF. 18 [hereinafter "Kristol & Kagan"]. 
183. Id. at 32. 
184. Id. at 23-27. 
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important from the trivial."185 She urged rejection of the idea that 
American exercise of power is only legitimate when exercised on behalf 
of someone or something else (such as international law) and urged 
instead explicit pursuit of American self-interest. 186 Pursuit of American 
self-interest would focus policy on the priorities: ensuring American 
ability to project power through a strong military, promoting economic 
growth and political openness by extending free trade and a stable 
international monetary system, seeking strong relationships with allies, 
developing relationships with Russia and China to mold the 
international political system and dealing with the threat of rogue 
regimes which fuel the potential for terrorism and the spread of 
weapons of mass destruction. 187 
The core ideas of the Bush Doctrine have been described as a short 
shrift for NATO and the U.N., dismissal of treaties as non-binding, and 
"brazen" protectionism. 188 This new "grand strategy" envisions an 
America "less bound to its partners and to global rules and institutions, 
while it steps forward to play a more unilateral and anticipatory role in 
attacking terrorist threats and confronting rogue states seeking weapons 
of mass destruction." 189 
(b) The decision to attack Iraq 
The Bush Administration, like the Clinton Administration, 
perceived that any international strategy would mean little unless the 
American people would show support. The Bush Administration needed 
a way to crystallize the new National Security Strategy in concrete 
action, without which the Strategy might become an empty 
pronouncement. Politics is the art of the possible and the science of 
185. Condoleezza Rice, Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interest, 79 FOREIGN 
AFF. 45-46 [hereinafter "Rice"] . 
186. Id. at 47. 
187. Id. at 46-47. 
188. Michael Hirsh, Bush and the World, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 18, 20 (1996) [hereinafter 
Hirsh]; id. at 22 (reporting on convergence between realist internationalists such as 
Rumsfeld and Cheney and neoconservatives led by Wolfowitz, which leaves moderate 
unilateralists such as Powell and Haas lonely). 
189. G. John Ikenberry, America's Imperial Ambition, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 44, 49; id. at 
49-55. According to Ikenberry, the Bush strategy comprises seven elements: (1) 
commitment to maintain unipolar world, (2) assessment of terrorism threat as immune from 
appeasement or deterrence, (3) dismissal of deterrence as outdated and anticipatory use of 
force necessary, ( 4) devaluing of sovereignty to permit U.S. to use force across borders, ( 5) 
depreciation of international rules, treaties and security partnerships, (6) unconstrained and 
direct role for U.S. in responding to threats, and (7) backing away from international 
stability as a goal. Id. at 49-55. 
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timing. The September 11th attacks satisfied the "scientific" timing 
element for a bold move, leaving the question of what sort of move was 
''possible." What kind of bold assertion of U.S. power after the military 
success in Afghanistan could receive public support in the U.S., while 
otherwise satisfying U.S. goals? 
A number of candidates, otherwise qualified because of their 
support for international terrorism, could be ruled out as impracticable. 
Saudi Arabia was perceived as the staunchest U.S. ally in the region, 
although most of the September 11 hijackers were Saudis and 
overwhelming evidence existed demonstrating that Saudi elements were 
the most important sponsors of al Qaeda, other terrorist networks and of 
fundamentalist Islam. Moreover, a move against the Saudis would 
threaten important oil resources on which the U.S. and its allies depend. 
Iran was a tempting target, but is strong militarily. Libya had long been 
a sponsor of terrorism and an international pariah, but Mumar Quadaffi 
had not done anything recently to arouse public opinion against him. 
North Korea was a candidate for some kind of aggressive action 
because it could preempt rapidly developing nuclear capability. 
However, North Korea had little connection with terrorism or the 
Middle East, and military action against North Korea could have 
provoked Chinese response against Taiwan or other action. 
Pakistan might have been a strong candidate because of its historic 
support for radical Islam in Afghanistan and elsewhere, but Pakistan 
was a strong and essential supporter of U.S. action in Afghanistan. A 
move against Pakistan would have been a case of biting the hand that 
feeds you. 
The process of elimination left the Iraqi regime of Saddam 
Hussein. Iraq had thumbed its nose at the U.N., supporting the inference 
that it was determined to develop weapons of mass destruction. The 
international community was in a state of ongoing military conflict to 
enforce the no-fly zones. Iraq, though ruled by a secular government, 
was largely Muslim in population. It was linked with the Middle East. 
Although there were few connections between the Iraqi regime and al 
Qaeda, Saddam was known to provide support to local terror networks 
in Palestine and Israel. This left Iraq as the only plausible target for 
further bold action. The challenge then was to rally public support in the 
U.S. and internationally. The context, provided by the new National 
Security Strategy made the former much more important than the latter. 
The Bush Administration's Iraq initiative brings two inspirational 
activities to the forefront of American foreign policy, activities that 
were also embraced by the Clinton Administration; spreading 
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democracy as a goal of foreign policy and nationbuilding. Both were 
and are anathema to the realist and neorealist ideologies that dominated 
much of the pre-Iraq debate. While embracing these goals could 
represent common ground among adherents and critics of the Bush 
Doctrine, the way the Bush Administration embraces these goals 
diminishes the likelihood of consensus. 
2. The invasion avoids the real threats to American Interests 
The threats to America's interests in the twenty-first century are 
fundamentally different from those in the twentieth. In the twentieth 
century, threats arose from essentially state-based extension of power 
over geography. Although geopolitical factors have not disappeared 
from the international equation, most twenty-first century threats arise 
from failure of states to channel and contain the forces of reaction to 
modernity, including globalization. This failure results in terrorism and 
failed states. The principal effects of the U.S.-led attack on Iraq will 
prove to be acceleration of the spread of weapons of mass destruction, 
intensification of the terrorism threat, greater difficulty in persuading 
other states to join with the United States in initiatives that promote 
mutual interest-as perceived by U.S. leadershii:r-and diminished 
credibility for the efficacy of military power. 
The invasion of Iraq as the first project of the Bush Doctrine 
undercuts development of constructive attitudes in the American 
electorate about how international relations works and how U.S. foreign 
policy can best keep America secure and prosperous while promoting 
democracy and human rights in the rest of the world. Repeated 
rhetorical reference to "war" and "wartime," accompanied by heavy-
handed response to criticism, reinforces domestic disdain for serious 
long-term democracy development efforts. It beats ploughshares into 
swords in the minds of the American public. Even as President Bush 
uses his "bully pulpit" to narrow the view of the American public and to 
diminish their understanding of the hard realities of international 
relations and national security, the Bush Doctrine is making it more 
difficult to embrace international opportunities. 
(a) The invasion of Iraq is based on a fundamental misunderstanding 
of the genesis of terrorism 
Protecting America against terrorist attacks on our territory or on 
the territory of our allies cannot succeed without accepting the fact that 
terrorism arises from failures to deal with reactions to modernity and 
globalization. American foreign policy cannot succeed without a 
50
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2004], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol31/iss2/2
2004] Iraq and the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy 199 
strategy aimed at overcoming the failures and, in the meantime, blunting 
the forces of reaction. The U.S.-led attack on Iraq, despite being 
presented as related to the campaign against terrorism, has seriously 
distracted the U.S. from an effective initiative to reduce the terrorist 
threat. 190 It also misleads the public as to what a campaign against 
terrorism entails. 
The Iraq war will intensify terrorism. The phenomenon of 
terrorism is closely associated with successful recruitment of young 
people whose humiliation can be turned into the kind of rage that 
produces a continuing supply of suicide bombers. Such recruitment is 
made easier by American conduct that easily can be characterized as 
disdainful of values held by other societies and pessimism that nothing 
other than violence can discourage American intrusion. When American 
power is focused on ideologies such as Islam, the recruitment process is 
made easier. 
Societies where education is available with limited opportunities 
are breeding grounds for extremism. Creating opportunities for 
participation in public life and economic activity will enhance political 
stability and reduce the allure of religious extremism for future 
generations. Such opportunities arise only when progress is made 
toward rule of law, civil society and market competition. The same 
kinds of institutions necessary for a liberal democracy: courts and 
judiciaries, independent political parties, judges and bar associations, 
analogs of parent-teacher associations, leagues of women voters, 
veterans of foreign wars, rotary clubs, alumni associations appropriate 
for local cultures, ministries of culture and education, trade promotion 
agencies, chambers of commerce, trade associations and trade unions 
all provide pathways of participation for those with ambition. 191 
Demonizing Islam and pronouncing a "War on Terrorism" are 
unresponsive to these realities. Moreover, the U.S. must recognize that 
its public diagnosis of the terrorism threat differs fundamentally from its 
European allies. The metaphor of a "War" on terrorism suggests that 
conventional, predominantly military, responses will be effective. The 
European perception is that terrorism is a polycentric phenomenon, 
190. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., U.S. Power and Strategy after Iraq, 82 FOREIGN AFF. 60, 72-73 
("metaphor of war should not blind Americans to the fact that suppressing terrorism will 
take years of patient, unspectacular civilian cooperation with other countries in areas such as 
intelligence sharing, police work, tracing financial flows, and border controls;" all the 
precision bombing in Afghanistan destroyed only a small fraction of Al-Qaeda's network, 
which retained cells in some 60 countries; bombing cannot resolve the problem of cells in 
Hamburg or Detroit). 
191. See generally supra Part 11.D. 
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paradigmatically illustrating the ascendancy of non-state based forces in 
the 21st century. As such, it must be met with fundamentally different 
approaches from those historically used to counter or preempt state-
based threats. 
(b) The Iraq invasion encourages other states to arm or ally against 
America 
Historically, states have been uncomfortable when another state is 
so powerful that they must acquiesce in its foreign policy. When this 
occurs, weaker states tend to adopt foreign policies to contain the power 
of stronger states. In the 21st century, this can take the form of 
acquiring weapons of mass destruction to deter the stronger state from 
actions antagonistic to the interests of weaker states. It can also take the 
form of alliances against the stronger state. There is no reason to 
suppose that this tendency has disappeared. Accordingly, one measure 
of success in U.S. foreign policy is reduced incentives for other states to 
arm or ally against America. 
The Iraq adventure represents a dramatic move in the wrong 
direction. It will encourage the spread of weapons of mass destruction to 
rogue states and will encourage development of alliances aimed at 
countering American power. 
(1) The Iraq invasion will intensify the spread of weapons of mass 
destruction 
Leaders of foreign states, especially those opposing U.S. policies, 
will worry about unrestrained application of U.S. military power. The 
war in Iraq teaches that the United States will be willing to attack 
another state for the purpose of deposing its leadership, even when most 
of the rest of the world opposes the enterprise. The crucial foreign 
policy question for those leaders will be how to deter U.S. action against 
their government. A further lesson from the Iraq war is that a foreign 
state has little hope of prevailing through reliance on conventional 
military force. The only effective approaches to deterrence are weapons 
of mass destruction, as North Korea has learned, or sponsorship of 
terrorism. 
(2) The Iraq invasion will encourage Europe to form another 
geopolitical pole 
American interests are served better by a cooperative relationship 
with Europe than by an antagonistic one, especially if European 
antagonism manifests itself in hostile trade policies or in development 
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of an independent military capability. As political integration in Europe 
proceeds, possibilities will increase for an independent European 
foreign policy. European history and tradition, reinforced by resentment 
about the rough rhetoric used by the Bush Administration in the run-up 
to the invasion of Iraq, increases the risk that Europe will seek ways to 
counterbalance U.S. power .192 
Charles Kupchan offers a useful comparative analysis of the major 
scenarios articulated by commentators and scholars on the future of 
international relations. 193 Kupchan disagrees with many of them and 
suggests that a unipolar world dominated by the United States is both 
stable and beneficial. He suggests, "unipolarity is here, but it will not 
last long."194 The near-term challenger to the United States is, in his 
view, not a single country trying to play catch-up but a "European 
Union that is in the process of aggregating the impressive economic 
resources that its member nations already possess."195 
Kupchan believes that a culmination of unilateralism and 
isolationism will leave the United States alone as it seeks to pursue its 
interests.196 He expects a multi-polar World, with the United States 
being one pole, and Europe and East Asia the other two.197 He argues 
that integration of Europe will continue and that its growing 
assertiveness will split an essentially unipolar Atlantic alliance into two 
new poles, much as the Roman Empire split into the Eastern Empire and 
the Western Empire.198 "For now ... it is Europe that is emerging as 
America's only major competitor."199 
Sharp disagreements over the invasion of Iraq between the United 
States on the one hand, and Germany and France on the other, obviously 
represent a flashpoint in U.S.-European relations. Mocking of the "Old 
Europe" by Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, and a de-emphasis of the role 
192. See generally CHARLES A. KUPCHAN, THE END OF THE AMERICAN ERA (2002). 
193. Id. at 46-50. 
194. Id. at 61-63. Two trends suggest to him that American dominance will not last 
more than a decade. The first trend is a diffusion of power, and the second trend is a 
changing view of internationalism in the United States bowl. "Unipolarity rests on the 
existence of a polity that not only enjoys preponderance, but also is prepared to extend its 
dominant resources to keep everyone in line and to underwrite international order. If the 
United States were to tire of being the global protector of last resort, unipolarity still would 
come undone even if American resources were to remain supreme. KUPCHAN, supra note 
192, at 61-63 
195. Id. at 62. 
196. Id. at 67. 
197. Id. at 67-68. 
198. Id. at 119-120. 
199. KUPCHAN, supra note 166, at 159. 
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of NATO and of multilateral structures in general in the National 
Security Strategy will almost certainly make matters worse, and 
encourage development of a European foreign policy antagonistic to 
U.S. interests. 
(3) The Iraq invasion and other aspects of the Bush Doctrine will 
encourage Japan to form another pole 
Japan has been one of America's most dependable allies in the 
post-War era. Confident that the U.S. would protect it against China and 
other regional threats, Japan was content to maintain a low military 
profile and to pursue prosperity through international trade under a Pax 
Americana. U.S. preoccupation with Iraq and with the campaign against 
terrorism show signs of distracting it from broader strategic issues in 
Asia. The failure by the United States to manage relations with China 
effectively and the lack of engagement in dealing with North Korea's 
nuclear threat could encourage Japan over the long run to re-arm and to 
pursue an independent foreign policy. Charles Kupchan suggests the 
possibility of a convergence between Japan and China, which could 
represent a third geo-political pole, alongside Europe and the United 
States.200 
3. The invasion ignores the reality that that international relations now 
involves more than sovereign states 
Historically, foreign policy proceeded from two assumptions: 
military capability must aim at opposing and defeating armies directed 
by states; and diplomacy is defined by relations among states-the 
"billiard ball" theory of international relations. Now states are only one 
of several types of international actors. The central conceptual challenge 
of the war on terrorism is dealing with this reality. Winning the 
campaign against al Qaeda is not at all the same as driving Iraq from 
Kuwait or deterring a nuclear attack by the Soviet Union. A central flaw 
in the Bush Doctrine is that it proceeds from a "billiard ball" theory of 
international relations. 
In this century, political power has been diffused above and below 
the state level. States cede a measure of sovereignty upward in a 
complex framework of inter-governmental organizations, such as the 
World Trade Organization and the institutions of the European Union. 
They also exercise power constrained by the diffusion of political power 
into sub-state private groups, such as NGOs and militant organizations, 
200. KUPCHAN, supra note 166, at 278-81. 
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including the Kosovo Liberation Army, al Qaeda, Hamas, and 
Hezbollah.201 New information technologies, including the Internet, 
open up new channels for political interaction, both domestically and 
across national boundaries. At the same time, other technological 
advances place powerful new weapons-anti-aircraft missiles and 
biological weapons-into the hands of individuals and groups. An 
effective U.S. foreign policy must deal with this reality instead of 
pretending that the much-easier task of playing diplomatic chess with a 
limited number of state actors is sufficient.202 Disturbing signs exist that 
the Bush Doctrine and the invasion of Iraq tum back toward treating the 
world as a billiard table. If one accepts the neo-realist theory of 
international relations, then the Iraq invasion may look like good 
foreign policy because it alters the balance of state-based power in the 
Middle East. 
Realists such as John Mearshimer and Charles Kupchan treat 
international relations as interactions among impermeable states-
"billiard balls." Though they reach different conclusions about its 
effects, Mearshimer predicts fragmentation into a multipolar system, in 
which stability is assured only by a limited proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. Kupchan predicts an end to U.S. dominance, with the U.S. 
opposed by Europe, and possibly by a China-Japan axis. 
The problem with realist theories is that they treat states as 
inanimate, influenced by interstate forces, much as physics views 
atomic elements, influenced by electrical fields and intra-atomic forces. 
Their theories give short shrift to leadership, good and bad, and to the 
uncertainties of political conflict within states. They suggest that states 
will behave in certain ways in response to changes in the _balance of 
power, but they do not explain why. Another popular commentator, 
Thomas Friedman suggests why these realist theories are incomplete: 
states respond to popular opinion, which in tum is influenced by global 
201. See William 0. Beeman, A Formidable Muslim Bloc Emerges, Los ANGELES 
TIMES, May, 27, 2003, at B13 ("The U.S. is used to thinking of the world in terms of 
individual nation-states. But the Shiites are a transnational force. The U.S. has unwittingly 
supplied the key linkage for this bloc by destroying the secular government of Saddam 
Hussein. That brought that country's Shiite majority to the fore, creating a solid line of 
Shiite-dominated nations from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean Sea."). 
202. See Nye, supra note 164, at 72-73 (power is "widely distributed and chaotically 
organized" among state and non state actors; United States cannot obtain outcomes it wants 
without agreement of European Union, Japan, and others; "by devaluing soft power and 
institutions, the new unilateralist coalition of Jacksonians and Neo-Wilsonians is depriving 
Washington of some of its most important instruments for the implementation of the new 
national security strategy."). 
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as well as intra-state forces. 203 
The Iraq invasion looks very different if one rejects the "billiard-
ball" theory of international relations. The invasion will make it harder 
for the U.S. to persuade other nations to join forces. "Because the world 
gets only marching orders from Bush and not a common visions, it will 
be less inclined to follow them."204 In the short run, some former 
adversaries are willing to help rebuild relations. 
(a) Foreign popular opinion, shaped by democratic politics, matters 
U.S. foreign policy needs to concern itself with popular opinion 
both at home and abroad. In other words, it needs to accept the insights 
of scholars associated with the "domestic politics" branch of liberal 
international relations theory, and to recognize the incompleteness of 
nee-realism in international relations theory.205 
Realist international relations theory obscures the importance of 
foreign public opinion in international relations because it treats states 
as impermeable, represented by leaders who accurately perceive state 
interests and act rationally in pursuit of those interests.206 No foreign 
policy or national security strategy can be effective if it only focuses on 
the actions of states. International legitimacy is built or undermined 
nowadays, not only by arguments made by diplomats and chiefs of 
government to their counterparts around the world; it is also shaped by 
public perceptions of human suffering and injustice. In fact, foreign 
leaders, especially in democratic political systems, act like American 
politicians. Foreign policy issues are part of an overall matrix of 
political calculation. If it is unpopular in their country to support 
American positions, leaders of other countries are more likely to oppose 
American positions. This is why popular legitimacy is so important, and 
why an American foreign policy that looks arrogant and unconcerned 
with the interests and welfare of other parts of the world is so damaging. 
203. Thomas L. Freidman, Restoring Our Honor, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 2004, at A35 . 
(arguing that America's moral authority matters because mass opinion matters in 
international relations) 
204. Hirsh, supra note 162, at 28. 
205. "In its modem iteration, liberal international relations theory has come to stand for 
the straightforward proposition that domestic politics matter." Oona A Hathaway, Do 
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference? 111 YALE L .J. 1935, 1952 (2002). 
206. This is the "billiard ball" metaphor. See William C. Bradford, International Legal 
Regimes and the Incidence of Interstate War in the Twentieth Century: A Cursory 
Quantitative Assessment of the Associative Relationship, 16 AM. U. INT'L L. REv. 647, 665 
n. 57 (2001). (stating that realists embrace ""billiard ball" model of the international system, 
in which states are regarded as identical in · form and function and opaque with regard to 
domestic regime type and state society relations"). 
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This is hardly a new idea. Any experienced negotiator knows that 
negotiators often defend their positions and their refusals to acquiesce to 
opposing positions based on their perception of constituent pressures.207 
Foreign policy theory must be connected to the reality of international 
negotiations, and that reality includes the growing impact of public 
opinion in a world increasingly democratic and transparent. 
American policy must treat international politics as politics. 
Decision makers in foreign states behave like decision makers in the 
United States. If they function in a democratic political system, they are 
constantly asking themselves, "what will I run on; what will resonate 
with the voting public?" When American diplomats want to gain 
support from other states, they must put themselves in the position of 
the popularly elected decision makers in the foreign states and ask 
themselves the same questions. The necessity of this kind of projected 
political analysis means that American foreign policy must be 
conditioned in substantial measure by the impact of perceived American 
positions on foreign public opinion. When the President of the United 
States is greeted by mass demonstrations in opposition to American 
policy in England, it matters.208 When opinion surveys say that 90 
percent of the Spanish population is opposed to Spain's involvement in 
Iraq, it matters. When the candidate for reelection as Chancellor of 
Germany runs on a platform of opposition to American foreign policy 
regarding Iraq and America's campaign against terror, it matters. 
In the dynamics of internal politics, Diaspora opinion counts. In the 
United States, the Jewish Diaspora has enormous influence in American 
politics, as do the Irish and the Polish. The same thing is true in other 
countries. The history of the breakup of Yugoslavia indicates that the 
Croatian Diaspora in Germany had considerable influence on the 
decision of the German government to break ranks with the rest of 
Europe and to insist on the recognition of .Slovenia and Croatia after 
they seceded from Yugoslavia. As Islamic populations in Europe grow 
207. See, e.g. Keith Bradsher & Joseph Kahn, Running for Re-election, Taiwan Leader 
Takes on China, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2003 at page A7 (explaining how re-election position 
of Taiwan President seeking referendum on Chinese missile threat to Taiwan is destabilizing 
relations between China and Taiwan); James Bennet, An Ally of Sharon Foresees a 
Palestinian State, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2003, at page A6 (suggesting that position by senior 
leader of Likud Party is intended "to build support on the right" for action to break Middle-
East negotiation stalemate). Whether these political positions predominate in the domestic 
politics of Taiwan and Israel will affect foreign relations of those states. One cannot assume 
that Israel or Taiwan will take a position determined objectively by realist international 
relations theory. 
208. In undemocratic political systems the question may take the form of "What will 
resonate with the army-or other groups that keep me in power?" 
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the ability of the United States to gain support from European states 
depends upon the United States' ability to shake its reputation for 
leading a campaign against Muslim countries and Islam. 
This article does not argue for a "Wilsonian" approach to 
international relations. A crucial difference exists between Woodrow 
Wilson's approach to the world and a desirable American approach to 
the world in the twenty first century. Woodrow Wilson tended to over-
emphasize the impact of appropriate institutional arrangements on 
political behavior. He embraced public administration more than 
politics. What America needs is not so much a Wilsonian approach, as 
Wilson himself conceived it, but the approach of a political scientist and 
a practical politician. 209 The United States needs foreign policy makers 
who think about international politics and international relations from 
the same perspective that would be astute in thinking about domestic 
American politics. An effective American foreign policy would not 
look upon foreign leaders as completely autonomous decision-makers 
who can respond to American entreaties, or threats or inducements 
entirely on their own; it should instead look upon them as practical 
politicians, constrained by what they think their publics will accept in 
the long run. American foreign policy thus refocuses on what is 
necessary to shape popular opinion in foreign countries. 
This is a better perspective for understanding and shaping the 
behavior even of autocrats in non-democratic states. Any political 
leader who survives for long recognizes that there are limits on coercion 
as a means of maintaining power. At some point, the gap between 
decisions by a government and popular opinion may grow so wide that 
the result is revolution. Leaders of foreign states are likely to remember 
the example of the Shah of Iran, who was deposed despite 
overwhelming U.S. support simply because public opinion decided not 
to tolerate him further.110 
Public opinion matters not just in the United States, but in other 
states, which are increasingly democratic. By declaring that only U.S. 
interest matters in U.S. foreign policy, the United States forgoes its 
moral leadership, which makes it harder to convince foreign publics that 
209. See Anne Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. Soc'y 
lNT'L L. PROC. 240 (2000) (embracing view of "international political system as some 
political scientists see it-from the bottom-up rather than the top down .... ") [hereinafter 
Slaughter, Liberal Theory]. 
210. See Jeffrey Usman, The Evolution of Iranian Islamism from the Revolution 
Through the Contemporary Reformers, 35 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1679, 1704-05, n. 154 
(2002). (characterizing Islamic revolution in Iran as reaction to U.S. "conspiracy" with Shah 
to modernize Iranian society). 
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their leaders should support U.S. policy because it is good for them or 
good for the international system. If America has declared that it turns it 
back on others' interests and on international legal and political 
structures, few will believe that it is in their interest to support 
American initiatives. Those ambitious for political power are more 
likely to find domestic political resonance in a message that is anti-
American. There will be less domestic political risk in being at odds 
with America at the negotiating table, whether the issue is trade, 
stability in the Balkans, preserving the North Atlantic Alliance or 
disarming North Korea or Iran. 
(b) International Law and Other Formal Multistate Structures Matter 
Rhetoric seeking to shape public opinion depends importantly -
though not exclusively - on reference to international law.211 In 1997, 
Richard Haas wrote a book entitled The Reluctant Sheriff.212 The title 
signifies that the United States (the sheriff) finds itself in the position of 
having to build coalitions (the posse) in order to overcome threats to 
world peace and security. While the United States is the preeminent 
military power, it needs participation by other states to act effectively. 
Writing later, in 1999, Haas continues by arguing that "an effort to 
assert or expand U.S. hegemony will fail."213 The proper goal for 
American foreign policy, in his view, was to "encourage a multipolarity 
characterized by cooperation and concern rather than competition and 
211 . "The Holy Grail of politically-oriented international law scholars has been to 
reconnect our discipline with the study of political science and international relations, a 
connection lost since at least the 1950s. Some prominent international relations scholars 
flatly rejected law as anything worth considering, while political scientists generally became 
mired in methodological thickets as irrelevant as the old positivist scholarship. In the past 
decade, however, the disciplines have been fruitfully reunited. Anne-Marie Slaughter and 
Ken Abbott proposed agendas, and several scholars have used the two disciplines to 
elucidate particular areas of law. Most impressively, Michael Byers has studied power and 
customary international law using a sophisticated understanding of realism, regime theory, 
and traditional international law scholarship to show ways in which law makes a difference 
in state behavior." Phillip R. Trimble, The Plight of Academic International Law, 1 CHI. J. 
INT'L L. 117, 122-123 (2000) citing Harold Hongju Koh, Review Essay, Why Do Nations 
Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L. J. 2599 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International 
Law and International Relations Theory: A Dual Agenda, 87 AM. J. INTL L. 205 (1993); 
Kenneth W. Abbott, Modern International Relations Theory: A Prospectus for International 
Lawyers, 14 YALE J. INTL L. 335 (1989); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Andrew S. Tulumello and 
Stepan Wood, International Law and International Relations Theory: A New Generation of 
Interdisciplinary Scholarship, 92 AM. J. INTL L. 367 (1998). 
212. Haas subsequently was Director of Policy Planning in the Bush State Department 
and then President of the Council on Foreign Relations. 
213. Richard N. Haas, What to Do With American Primacy, 78 FOREIGN AFF. 37, 38 
(1999). 
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conflict."214 A policy aimed at pursuit of this goal would comprise four 
elements: less reliance on military force to resolve disputes, "reducing 
the number of weapons of mass destruction," accepting a limited 
doctrine of humanitarian intervention, "based on a recognition that 
people-and not just states--enjoy rights," and opening markets to 
economic competition.215 The economic goal would encourage free 
movement of the factors of production across international lines and 
transparent domestic markets favoring private initiative.216 
My 1998 review of Haas' book embraced the sheriff and posse 
metaphors, while arguing that the metaphors necessitate attention to the 
role of international law and multilateral institutions.217 The sheriff in 
the Old West had to persuade the public. A posse, whether or not 
organized by the sheriff, was a lynch mob unless a court-issued writ 
authorized its formation and activity. Similarly, international law plays 
a major role in legitimizing the modem form of an international posse. 
International law comprises not only norms but also institutions for 
coordinating action, for modifying norms and for resolving disputes. 
Acting through these institutions reduces transaction costs and enhances 
popular support because it appears law abiding. "Every major 
international institution ... was made in America. And taken together, all 
this institution building has amounted to a workable international 
system, one in which democracy and free markets seem to be an ever-
rising tide."218 The human rights movement lies at the core of the 
transformation of international law from a regime that focused entirely 
on the relationships among states into a regime that focuses on the 
relationship between states and natural persons. American prosperity 
has come to depend on continued functioning of the international 
system. U.S. corporations now operate through transnational integrated 
production systems that depend on hospitable policies in foreign states 
and accepting attitudes by NGOs.219 "The U.S. economy, meanwhile, 
had become addicted to the Wall Street-centered international financial 
system. America had become a new user of other nations' capital, 
enabling Americans to habitually buy more goods from abroad than 
214. Id. 
215. Id. at 39. 
216. Id. at 41. 
217. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Richard Haas, The Reluctant Sheriff: The United States 
after the Cold War, 26 SYRACUSE J. lNT'L. L. & COM. 95 (1998) (book review). 
218. Hirsh, supra note 162, at 31. 
219. Id. at 32. 
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they sell to others. ,,iio 
The Bush Doctrine is startling for its abandonment of a 
commitment to a rule of law in international affairs and its disdain for 
multilateral frameworks. The chapter of the National Security Strategy 
document entitled "Cooperation" makes almost no mention of the 
United Nations, of NA TO of the WTO or of other treaty frameworks. 
The "new imperialism" of the Bush strategy is associated with 
several risks.221 Neo-imperialist approaches are likely to prove 
unsustainable. American unilateralism will diminish the willingness of 
other states to participate in multilateral efforts to monitor and enforce 
non-proliferation commitments, which will leave the part of the Bush 
strategy focused on weapons of mass destruction "blind and deaf."222 
The use of force to eliminate regimes seeking to acquire weapons of 
mass destruction or to support terrorism must be followed by extended 
nationbuilding activities to "put the target country ... back together," 
and this is likely to require greater resources than the American people 
are prepared to commit.223 Unilateralism is unlikely to generate 
multilateral cooperation in the areas of "intelligence, law enforcement 
and logistics."224 Foreign states, unable to oppose the U.S. militarily 
will fall back on the only non-violent weapon they have: lack of 
cooperation.225 American arrogance, in the long run, is likely to generate 
"self-encirclement"-alliances aimed at containing the United States. 226 
The United States should reaffirm its commitment to multilateral 
institutions, beginning with the U.N. The U.S. should resume the efforts 
begun during the Clinton Administration under the leadership of 
Madeleine Albright and Richard Holbrook, to strengthen the 
governments' ability to deal with new problems of terrorism and the 
construction of civil society. The United Nations is a symbol of the 
potential of multilateral cooperation. Despite its deficiencies, the U .N. 
has made progress under the leadership of Secretary General Kofi 
Annan and Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, who worked to bridge 
differences between the organization and the American right, 
220. Id. 
221. See Eliot A Cohen, History and the Hyperpower, 83 FOR. AFF. 49 (2004). 
(evaluating Bush foreign policy as imperialist); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., U.S. Power and Strategy 
after Iraq, 82 FOR. AFF. 60 (2003). (noting that Bush foreign policy is increasingly labeled 
as "imperial"). 
222. See Ikenberry, supra note 163, at 56. 
223 . Id. at 57. 
224. Id. at 58. 
225. Id. 
226. Id. at 58-59. 
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represented by Senator Jesse Helms. 
4. The Bush Doctrine Ignores New Geopolitical Opportunities 
While realist theories of international relations are incomplete, they 
nevertheless offer insights; states matter in international relations, and 
big states matter greatly.227 American foreign policy cannot succeed 
unless it appropriately engages Russia, China, Europe, Japan and the 
rest of the Western Hemisphere. The end of the Cold War presents 
major geopolitical opportunities. The Iraq invasion distracts American 
foreign policy from those opportunities. 
(a) Realignment with Russia is Possible 
The attacks of September 11 and reaction to them provide the best 
opportunity since the Second World War for fundamental realignment 
of relationships between Russia and the United States. Three new 
realities frame this opportunity. First, America and Russia have a 
common interest in opposing terrorism rooted in Islamic 
fundamentalism. Second, the military operations in Afghanistan have 
led the United States to appreciate the importance of South Asia far 
more than it did fifteen years ago when it armed the Taliban and helped 
it run the Russians out, and then virtually abandoned the region. Third, 
Russia's rich petroleum and natural gas reserves represent a potential 
solution to U.S. dependence on Middle East oil. If Russia comes to 
supply a greater portion of U.S. energy needs, an important new trade 
flow will link the countries economically, as the U.S. becomes a 
growing source of foreign exchange for Russia. 
Apart from avoidance of major-power conflict, dealing 
successfully with smaller-scale problems depends on the willingness of 
major powers to cooperate. Russia's position was a crucial part of the 
political and military matrix for success in Kosovo and in 
Afghanistan. 228 The idea of building a new relationship with Russia 
represents common ground between the Bush Administration and its 
critics. The invasion of Iraq represents an approach to relationship 
building that is destined to fail. 229 
Russia has downplayed Iraq as a problem, and has been more 
227. See Evan Criddle, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in U.S. Treaty 
Interpretation, 44 VA. J. lNT'L L. 432, 470 (2004)(describing state-centric view of realist 
school of international relations theory). 
228. See TIM JUDAH, WAR AND REVENGE 272-79 (2000). (describing Russian role in 
brokering Milosevic' s agreement to end the war in Kosovo). 
229. As the two following paragraphs explain. 
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active than the West Europeans in trying to patch things up. On his visit 
to St. Petersburg before the G8 meeting in mid-2003, President Bush 
found Putin, for the first time, showing more eagerness to cozy up to 
U.S. than the other way around. Russia was very helpful in the Security 
Council on working out language for transfer of power, and 
international involvement in Iraq. Russia complains about the U.S. 
doctrine of prevention, but indications are that the opposition comes 
more from the Russian military than from senior political leaders. The 
criticism is not very aggressive; it mainly takes the form of saying that 
"events show that we were right in opposing the Iraq invasion and that 
we need renewed cooperation. "230 
This apparent thaw in Russian-U.S. relations is likely to prove 
illusory in the long run because it has too narrow a base. Russian 
foreign policy long has reflected paranoia about nationalism and 
Islam. 231 Enlisting Russia in what appears to be a campaign against 
Islam and disdaining multilateral structures that otherwise might prove 
attractive to Russian leadership seeking to define a new place of respect 
for Russia are likely to encourage Russian unilateralism which will not 
always serve U.S. interests. If the U.S. should pursue whatever it can 
get by with, why should not Russia? 
(b) Engagement of China is desirable 
The evolution of China from a closed, authoritarian, ideological, 
and militaristic society into one desiring economic development driven 
by market- oriented links to the rest of the world provides opportunities 
to reduce security tensions in Asia.232 Instead of viewing China as a 
military threat to the rest of the world, the United States must reinforce 
the internal Chinese forces interested in modernization, while reassuring 
China that its physical integrity is not threatened by openings to foreign 
230. See Steven Lee Myers, Putin Says U.S. Faces Big Risks in Effort in Iraq, N.Y. 
TIMES, Oct. 6, 2001, at Al. (reporting Putin's criticism of U.S.-led invasion oflraq but also 
reporting desire to have good relations with Iraq). 
231. See Anssi Kullberg, From Neo-Eurasianism to National Paranoia: Renaissance of 
Geopolitics in Russia, EURASIAN POLITICIAN, Issue 4 (Aug. 2001 ), available at 
http://www.cc.jyu.fi/-aphamala/pe/issue4/duginism.htm (last visited July 8, 
2004)(describing internal conflicts in Russian foreign policy thinking). 
232. See Wu Zhengyu, China and East Asia Security in the 2 JS' Century-Challenges 
and Implications, available at 
http://www.dur.ac.uk/chinese.politics/public%20lectures/WU%20Zhengyu%20Durham%20 
Lecture.pdf. (last visited July 8, 2004)(noting that China's integration into international 
community generally has increased stability in East Asia, but that other, more threatening 
scenarios also exist). 
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ideas and capital. 233 Helping China build the institutions of a civil 
society are central to such an approach. 
The Bush Administration appropriately places priority on dealing 
with China, but its policies undervalue the best way to ensure that China 
interacts with its neighbors peacefully and participates in the world 
community according to the rules. Advocates of multilateralism believe 
that China's role in the WTO and U.N. gives it a stake in helping to 
maintain world order.234 "Is there any better way, for example, of co-
opting the putative next superpower, China, into the international 
system than to mold its behavior though the WTO and the U .N. Security 
Council?"235 The architects of the Bush Administration policy prefer an 
American policy that identifies China as a threat, to be contained with 
threat of military force. 236 
Moreover, the Bush Administration has proven bizarrely 
insensitive to the risks of increased Chinese commitment to weapons of 
mass destruction. 237 The controversy over Iraq obscures the fact that the 
Bush Administration actually softened opposition to a buildup of the 
Chinese nuclear arsenal to buy acquiescence with respect to its plans for 
a National Missile Defense.238 
(c) The Iraq Invasion has pushed off the Policy Agenda Opportunities 
to lead this Hemisphere into Democracy and Prosperity 
American foreign policy has always included a special regard for 
conditions in the Western Hemisphere. Its proximity has caused the 
United States, from the time it expressed the Monroe Doctrine, to insist 
that no foreign adversary gain a foothold in the Americas. Cuba 
represents the only significant failure of this policy. Trade relations, 
common language and cultural ties with Canada make Canadian 
relations important, even without the possibility that Canada would 
become a military threat. Improving economic prospects and 
encouraging stable democratic governments in Latin America reduces 
the likelihood of security threats from that part of the region. It also 
presents the best prospects for reducing labor market pressures that 
233. See David Shambaugh, Facing Reality in China Policy, 80 FOREIGN AFF. 50 
(2001). 
234. Id. 
235. Hirsh, supra note 162, at 31. 
236. See Shambaugh, supra note 233 (global affairs will be "profoundly destabilized" 
by an American policy that confronts China; U.S. must have strategic vision to "help funnel 
China's progress in a peaceful, constructive direction."). 
237. Hirsh, supra note 162, at 35-36. 
238. Id. 
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underlie illegal immigration to the U.S. Sustained American 
engagement, defined by pressure to open up economic competition, to 
protect human rights and to build the institutions of democracy and civil 
society has produced much success over the last twenty years toward 
ending Latin America's reputation as a collection of military 
autocracies. 
Before the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. had two important 
opportunities for refining and extending this policy into the twenty-first 
century: Mexico and the Mercosur block: Argentina and Brazil. Under 
the leadership of President Vicente Fox, Mexico experienced a peaceful 
political revolution.239 The United States must continue to encourage 
political evolution in Mexico by embracing new concepts for managing 
cross-border product, capital, and labor markets. We must improve our 
understanding of how Mexicans in the United States interact with their 
communities of origin. The Mexican Diaspora can be a force for 
economic development if it is explicitly engaged. 
Before its recent economic collapse in Argentina, the Mercosur 
block was an example of stunning economic and political reform in 
Brazil and Argentina. 240 Argentina was the model of a country that takes 
American advice on reforming its economy. In many respects the advice 
was beneficial. Ultimately, underlying forces in the Argentinean 
economy brought the experiment to an unhappy end. The U.S. must not 
only be fully engaged with Argentina's government on steering a course 
through this crisis, but must learn how to give better advice in the 
future. Disengagement and indifference risk catastrophe. 
The war in Iraq has caused the U.S. to withdraw from embracing 
these important opportunities to help other countries. A blossoming 
special relationship between President Fox and President Bush, focused 
on new solutions to illegal immigration has withered, replaced by 
mutual antagonism over Mexico's refusal to support the U.S. position 
on Iraq. Relations with Canada similarly have soured for the same 
reasons. 
239. See Jorge A. Vargas, Mexican Law on the Web: the Ultimate Research Guide, 32 
INT'L J. LEGAL INFO. 34, 39 (2004) ("undemocratic" nature of Mexican political changes 
with election of Fox in 2000). 
240. See Thomas Andrew O'Keefe, The Central American Integration System (SICA) 
at the Dawn of a New Century: Will the Central American Isthmus Finally Be Able to 
Achieve Economic and Political Unity? 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 243, 254 (2001). (describing the 
success of Mercosur and its influence as a model for integration elsewhere in Latin 
America). 
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(d) The Iraq Invasion Undermines Pursuit of Effective Trade Policies 
Trade policy is an important tool in achieving America's foreign 
policy goals. The scheduled negotiations over extension of the WTO 
agreement, articulation of proposals for expanded free-trade agreements 
in the W estem hemisphere and the growing opposition to the WTO, 
combine to represent new opportunities for the United States to extend 
trade. These new opportunities also take into account the need to 
develop a trade policy that encompasses labor markets as well as 
product and capital markets. American prosperity depends upon the 
trade policies in the United States and its trading partners that keep 
foreign markets open to American goods and services. It depends on 
trade policies for capital markets that facilitate . the flow of foreign 
investment into the United States and allow American investors to enjoy 
investment security and reasonable rates of return abroad. More 
ambitiously, it depends on integrating trade policy with immigration 
policy, allowing trade agreements to regulate labor markets as well as 
markets for other factors of production. 
The full impact of the Iraq invasion on U.S. trade relations is not 
yet clear. However, as an example of a new self-interested the 
American foreign policy it has heightened trade tensions.241 The 
success of post World War Two trade liberalization has depended upon 
willingness by major trading partners to enter into and to respect 
permanent multilateral agreements. When United States foreign policy 
is expressed in terms of mistrust of such multilateral agreements, it 
inevitably raises questions about U.S. commitment to extend the web of 
multilateral trade agreements. The Bush Administration's imposition of 
steel quotas reinforced such a suspicion. 
(e) The Iraq invasion makes a Middle East peace settlement less likely 
Continued conflict between Israel and its neighbors jeopardizes 
U.S. interests because of the U.S. commitment to protect the Jewish 
Homeland, its sensitivity to the Jewish Community in the United States 
and the proven tendency of heightened tensions in the region to poison 
U.S.-Arab relations. For its first fourteen months, the Bush 
Administration was determined not to get involved in the Middle East -
to leave it to the parties to work out or for the Europeans or someone 
else to solve. Since then attention has been sporadic and mostly 
241. Jeff Madrick, Economic Science; America is paying a significant price for 
favoring unilateralism over international cooperation. Is the price too high? N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 25, 2003, at C2. (reporting increase in trade tension resulting from American 
unilateralism). 
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superficial. No U.S. strategy has been articulated to frame U.S. 
engagement. 
Despite the fanfare associated with President Bush's trip to the 
region and his formal unveiling of a "roadmap" for peace, available 
evidence suggests that the burst of attention was driven by desire to 
build Arab-state support for the Iraq invasion.242 American policy 
continues to be mostly reactive, motivated perhaps by agreement 
between the hawkish Sharon government in Israel and influential 
American neo-conservatives about reliance on force rather than 
facilitation of negotiations. The mediation of the "Geneva Accords," by 
private parties in early November 2003 represents a new opportunity. 
Whether the U.S. can take its eye off of Iraq and ideology long enough 
to embrace this opportunity remains to be seen. 
As it does in many other parts of the world, the Iraq invasion 
emphasizes the wrong aspects of American power. The invasion exalts 
conventional military force rather than careful attention to public 
opinion in resolving conflict and the creation of economic opportunity 
where little exists as a means of reducing the recruitment of terrorists. 
American engagement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must be framed 
by a sophisticated, practical, creative and clear plan for dealing with the 
two sources of deadlock. America must apply its power to assure 
implementation of mechanisms for bringing terrorism under control. 
America must also apply its power to assure evolution of a Palestinian 
civil society, one that does not teach hate to kindergartners, one that 
offers pathways other than extremism for fulfillment of ordinary human 
ambition and one that produces real economic progress. 
Terror can be brought under control in three ways. Outside forces 
can apply positive or negative incentives with Palestinians in the hope 
that they will ease their terror tactics. An outside force can interrupt the 
infrastructure necessary to support terrorism. For example, Israel or 
another state can prevent terrorists from reaching their targets. The 
United States must be engaged in all three of these approaches. The 
United States must increase incentives (not just issue Presidential 
edicts) for the Palestinian leadership to get the hate out of the 
schoolbooks and their political speeches. The United States must 
support action to interrupt terrorist infrastructure, including Israeli 
Defense Force action in the Palestinian territories unless someone else 
242. See Quartet Roadmap to Israeli-Palestinian Peace, available at 
http://www.mideastweb.org/quartetrm3.htm (last visited July 8, 2004)(reporting that Bush 
Administration responded to post-Iraq-invasion pressure to release new version of 
roadmap). 
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in the international community is prepared to perform the task. And the 
United States must insist that states now providing safe passage to 
terrorists on their way to targets in Israel (and elsewhere) exclude them. 
Progress in the Palestinian territories cannot come through the 
Palestinian Authority. The demonstrable lack of economic progress, the 
obvious corruption, and the large infusion of foreign aid from Europe, 
the Arab communities and the U.S. make it certain that leadership is 
necessary. Effective engagement in the Middle East means U.S. 
leadership for a regional economic development initiative, bringing 
together substantial economic aid, technical assistance and culturally 
compatible mentoring from the EU, the U.S., Saudi Arabia, Egypt, 
Turkey and elsewhere. The plan must involve direct administration of 
projects by the regional authority or its joint venturers; it cannot simply 
tum money over to the Palestinian Authority. Over time, the regional 
authority would devolve more control to local authorities as they prove 
their capacity to function honestly and effectively. 
This program must focus on the economic sphere; not the political 
and security spheres even though the three spheres obviously are 
interrelated. The conceptual model is multi-lateral, not unilateral. This 
model is that of the European Iron and Steel Community, which was 
started alongside and in parallel with NA TO at the end of World War II, 
motivated by the realization that economic development is a necessary 
condition for political stability, and that the common effort and mutual 
trust that grows out of economic relations can blossom into trust and 
formal arrangements in the political and security spheres. For example, 
some form of international presence in the region might be helpful, 
ranging from a handful of U.N. monitors to a Kosovo-like military 
presence. The Iraq invasion undercuts U.S. leadership in putting 
together such a regional economic and security plan. 
5. The Bush Doctrine avoids fundamental restructuring of America's 
defense capability 
America must design its military and naval force structures to 
support its campaign against terrorism and to support its new 
commitments to nationbuilding, in addition to performing its more 
traditional roles of protecting against state-based military threats. 
Clausewitz famously observed that "war is simply a continuation of 
political intercourse, with the addition of other means."243 Defense 
243. CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 605 (Michael Howard ed. & Peter Paret trans., 
Princeton 1976) (commenting that "war is the extension of politics by other means"). 
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policy must be developed to serve foreign policy.244 
National defense strategy must be based on a sophisticated 
understanding of how the armed forces can respond effectively to each 
threat. Threats to U.S. security come not only from potential attacks 
launched by foreign states, but also from armed groups like al Qaeda. 
Threats may also come from sheer hopelessness in places like the 
Ukraine, which is driving newly independent states back into the arms 
of traditional protectors like Russia. 
Peacekeeping and war-fighting missions are not entirely distinct; in 
fact they overlap. The best force-structure and training approaches 
increase the overlap as much as possible to avoid the need for two 
armies, one for peacekeeping and one for fighting a war. The 
appropriate doctrine can increase the amount of overlap. For example, a 
peace enforcement doctrine can call for use of military forces to secure 
and pacify an area for a limited period of six months, and then to 
withdraw, with a rapid-response capability if trouble overwhelms other 
forces. ("Other" forces must, of course, exist.245) 
One example of this problem can be found in General Wesley 
Clark's book about the Kosovo conflict. There he reveals that U.S. 
military leaders were reluctant to provide resources to win the campaign 
in Kosovo because they wanted to protect options to fight hypothetical 
conventional wars in other parts of the world.246 Clark also discusses 
the reluctance of the U.S. defense establishment to reinforce the civil 
aspect of the peace accords in Bosnia.247 Such reluctance must be 
overcome; the armed services have important roles to play in 
peacekeeping, nationbuilding, and anti-terrorism. The United States 
should spend more money on training personnel to be effective 
244. One worrisome trend in the United States is the tendency of the armed forces and 
their advocates to constitute a separate interest group, suspicious of political leadership, and 
separated from the mainstream of American society by ideological differences. Such a 
cleavage is, in large part, a product of the Vietnam War and of the end to the draft. Too 
many Americans have no experience with the military, and too many military leaders have 
scant experience with other aspects of American life. This division is dangerous in the long 
run. In the short run, it leads to an illogical distinction between military missions, and 
peacekeeping and nation- building activities, thought to be entirely outside the competence 
of the defense establishment. 
245. See Henry H. Perritt, Jr., Policing International Peace and Security: International 
Police Forces, 17 Wis. INT'L L.J. 281 (1999) (arguing that the international community 
should develop better capability to perform policing functions in post-conflict situations). 
246. WESLEY K. CLARK, WAGING MODERN WAR 312-3 (2001)(describing Army 
reluctance to commit ground forces in Kosovo because of impact on ability to meet threats 
elsewhere in world). 
247. Id. at 62-3. (reporting concern about "mission creep" and steps taken to reduce 
the likelihood of U.S. military getting drawn into civilian and law-enforcement matters). 
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peacekeepers and adjuncts to building a civil society in places like Iraq, 
Kosovo, Afghanistan, East Timor, Indonesia, the Philippines and 
Somalia. 248 American defense strategies must accommodate the need for 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement. There is a valid distinction 
between military and police operations. An international police force is 
a desirable tool; the U.S. armed forces should not be the only available 
tool when violence breaks out. 
The mismatch between the forces available and the problems to be 
solved is manifest in the Bush Administration's approach to the 
missions in Iraq and Afghanistan; in the professed inclination of U.S. 
military leadership in Afghanistan to keep its distance from the U.N.-
and British-led initiative to establish an interim government and to 
rebuild Afghanistan.249 The U.S. defense establishment needs more than 
policing and peace enforcement capability. In Iraq, the ~olitical 
trusteeship is organized through the Department of Defense. 25 If this 
pattern is followed in the future, the U.S. Defense Department must 
have expertise in civil administration and democracy development. 
Also, because terrorism looms as a new major threat, U.S. military 
doctrine and capability must be supported by more robust theories on 
the dynamics of terrorism and on what kinds of force application can 
interdict terrorist activities. Donald Rumsfeld's stated commitment to 
reform military force structures is too narrow. It focuses only on the 
military aspects of national security capability and neglects the political 
aspects, where the most creativity and policy leadership is needed. 
6. The Bush Doctrine increases the risk of a "Clash of Civilizations" 
Samuel Huntington's book, Clash of Civilizations, has infected 
some nee-realists in the Bush Administration with the view that a 
collision between the Islamic world and the rest of the world is 
inevitable. If one believes this, the best American foreign policy is one 
that opposes the Islamic world aggressively. America should not put 
resources into nationbuilding efforts in Muslim countries because they 
are destined to fail. 
There is growing evidence that this bleak view of international 
248. See Cohen, supra note 221, at 61 (arguing that U.S. should recruit and train cadres 
of administrators to supplement military capability in post-conflict situations); Building 
Civil Capacity for U.S. Stability Operations, U.S. Institute for Peace Spec. Report No 118 
(Apr. 2004) (recommending development of"Rule of Law Reserves"). 
249. A Job Half-Done in Afghanistan, N.Y.TIMES, May 15, 2003 editorial (criticizing 
Bush Administration for failing to focus sufficiently on magnitude of internal-security and 
civilian-reconstruction tasks). 
250. See supra Part II.A. I. 
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politics is unwarranted. Certain U.S. and European policies might 
indeed reinforce tendencies toward a clash of civilization, but other 
policies could reduce the potential for such a clash. Despite the calming 
rhetoric by President Bush after September 11 to urge the American 
people not to retaliate against Muslims, the subsequent attacks on Iraq 
and Afghanistan played into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists who 
could portray the United States as implacably hostile to Islam and 
Muslim countries. The devaluation of multilateral institutions suggests 
that the United States lacks respect for the many smaller countries-
many of them with significant Muslim populations-that participate 
through international organizations such as the U .N. The Bush Doctrine 
undervalues development of U.S. capacity to understand the forces at 
work in the Muslim world, where modernization clashes with traditional 
religious values and customs. This reinforces the perception that the 
United States is insensitive to the Islamic community. 
In Iraq, with U.S. reluctance to accept the aspirations of many Iraqi 
citizens to establish an Islamic Republic, the impression increases that 
the United States is hostile to Islam as a matter of policy. The Bush 
Administration's National Security Strategy is likely to make the clash 
of civilizations a reality even though that is not the inevitable course of 
the future. 
The Bush Administration, by placing undue reliance on military 
force, fails to embrace what would be the most potent weapon against 
terrorism: "a powerful, inclusive idealism with which the world can 
identify-a counter vision that will dispel the lingering attractions of 
Islamism, especially for younger generations in places such as Iran and 
the Palestinian territories. . . . Islamism ·must also be crushed in the 
world of ideas .... If the United States is in fact draining the swamp of 
terrorism-which is doubtful-it is certainly not filling it back in with 
something more appealing. "251 
C. Failure in Iraq will undercut the credibility of the Bush Doctrine 
While the easy military victory in Iraq might have instilled 
temporary fear in foreign regimes about what could happen to them if 
they opposed the U.S., U.S credibility is undermined by the confused 
and chaotic progress of building a "model democracy" after the war, 
and intelligence failures or outright deception about the presence of 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. If the U.S., despite the priority 
placed on building a model state in Iraq, cannot succeed in doing so, 
251. Hirsh, supra note 162, at 27-28. 
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why should others fear U.S. intervention or follow the U.S. lead in 
framing policies on how to deal with other crises? The demonstrated 
cost of poor U.S. understanding of the politics of constructing a liberal 
democracy in Iraq will encourage others on the international scene to 
question U.S. diagnoses and prescriptions and to prefer their own, 
whether the issue is the effect of economic sanctions, or the likelihood 
that another state possesses weapons of mass destruction. 
While the Administration may learn from its mistakes in Iraq, the 
fact remains that some of the missteps suggest that the Administration is 
not serious about its commitment to nationbuilding or to innovative 
forms of intervention. The Defense Department turned its back on an 
extensive State-Department planning process for post-war Iraq. It also 
shut down the peacekeeping school at the Army War College in the 
middle of the Iraq intervention. No one from the Administration called 
the leaders of the American Bar Association's CEELI, which probably 
has more knowledge on the rule of law in developing countries than any 
other U.S. institution. The Bush Administration has taken an Army 
lacking in "peacekeeping" skills and thrust it into nationbuilding role, 
even as it fails to reform the military. This is evidence that the Bush 
Doctrine is infeasible. 
The outcome of the U.S. intervention in Iraq will have an 
enormous impact on American ability to pursue a realist foreign policy. 
The logic of the National Security Strategy document depends on the 
willingness of foreign states to accept the premise that the U.S. power is 
overwhelming and that they oppose it at their peril. They may 
acquiesce to American commands out of fear of the consequences of 
military action against them. However, if military action against Iraq is 
unsuccessful in the long run, they will have less to fear. The leaders of 
foreign states are often astute in their assessment of American politics. 
There is every reason to believe that the leaders of North Vietnam and 
the Viet Cong perceived that eventually American public opinion would 
withdraw its support from American involvement in Vietnam. 
Accordingly, they consciously pursued a strategy of attrition, aiming at 
reaching the point in which America would withdraw. Their assessment 
was accurate, and they eventually prevailed. 
The same thing is likely to be the case going forward. Leaders of 
foreign states opposing the United States may be inhibited by the 
probability that American military intervention would drive them from 
power, but they also recognize that America's willingness to use its 
military power will be conditioned on its past experience. A failure in 
Iraq will make America more reluctant to use military force in the future 
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to depose foreign regimes, and foreign leaders will understand that. 
It may be that the Administration disdains a military role in 
nationbuilding. The fact is that it structured the political trusteeship in 
Iraq so that -nationbuilding was the responsibility of the Defense 
Department, apparently because it viewed other parts of the U.S. 
government and of the international community as unequal to the task. 
Donald Rumsfeld's campaign for restructuring the U.S. military is not 
having any discernable effect aside from the greater use of technology 
and lighter army units in conventional warfare. Nothing tangible is 
occurring with respect to fighting terrorism or enhancing peacekeeping 
or nationbuilding capability. Despite widely recognized limitations on 
the ability of the U.S. military to perform peacekeeping and 
nationbuilding missions, the Bush Administration closed the 
peacekeeping school at the U.S. War College in Carlisle, even as it was 
preparing its invasion of Iraq. 
Out of scores of papers posted on the Army War College, Naval 
War College and National Defense University Web sites, almost none 
address fighting terrorism; instead, they focus on traditional issues of 
conventional war and geopolitical strategy. An urgent priority is to 
begin to develop some intellectual capital about the military role in 
fighting terrorism. A good start would be to evaluate shortcomings in 
U.S. doctrine in Vietnam, Afghanistan and Iraq; to see what lessons also 
can be learned from the British experience in Ireland; and to analyze the 
frustrating experience of U.S. military involvement in the drug wars. It 
is likely that such a review would result in new ideas for integrating 
military activities with civilian activities in the intelligence and 
economic development spheres and an understanding of the potential 
and limitations of special operations focused on nodes in terrorist 
networks. 
D. Any Alternative to the Bush Doctrine must be as Popular with the 
American People 
Central to the argument that the Bush Doctrine is unsatisfactory 
and that the invasion of Iraq undercuts important U.S. foreign policy 
goals is the proposition that democratic politics in other places matters. 
Democratic politics in the United States matters too. No U.S. foreign 
policy can become a reality if it does not command support of the 
American People, no matter how sound in terms of international 
relations theory, no matter how compliant with international law, no 
matter how popular abroad. A President must not only have a logical 
foreign policy, one that works in the world; he also must be able-and 
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willing-to sell it domestically. Successful salesmanship is a necessary, 
not a sufficient, condition. Presidents can sell foreign policies that will 
not work. 
American foreign policy always has contended with competing 
isolationist and idealist currents in American public opinion. Its content 
has been determined as much by pragmatic American politics-what 
will sell at the ballot box-as by the merits of contending realist or 
idealist theories of international relations-the product of universities 
and think tanks.252 Theory helps make policy messages coherent, but the 
political process of forming positions and platforms draws as much 
from perception of interests that will move voters and opinion leaders as 
from theoretical analysis by experts. The natural tendency of policy in a 
democratic society to borrow a bit from contending advocates so as to 
gain a measure of support from both. 253 
The history of American foreign policy teaches that the idealist 
current in American public opinion does not represent a critical mass. 
The failure of the Wilsonian commitment to the League of Nations and 
to self-determination after World War I is strong evidence of that 
proposition. Understanding the post World War II U.S. commitment to 
the United Nations and to the other elements of the multinational treaty 
framework for international relations after the war is incomplete if it 
considers only the idealist motivation. Another motivation reinforced 
idealist tendencies: fear of the Soviet Union. The argument that won 
widespread bi-partisan support for a multilateral foreign policy was a 
combination of idealism and realism: the same multilateral institutions 
that represented an export of American ideals of democracy and self-
determination were ones that plausibly were well calculated to resist the 
threat from the Soviet Union and world Communism. Even in that 
political context, NATO and the Marshall Plan won stronger support 
than the United Nations, precisely because they were easier to link with 
defenses against military and economic threats to the United States. 
The Bush Doctrine and the invasion of Iraq were popular because 
the President persuaded the American People that they were necessary 
responses to the heightened threat to the U.S. after September 11, even 
though they flouted idealist commitments to multilateralism. Any 
alternative to the Bush Doctrine will not gain the same measure of 
252. Ikenberry, supra note 163, at 45-46 (noting realist orientation of containment 
and deterrence, and idealist orientation of open trade, democracy and "institutionalized 
relations" among states). 
253. See Ikenberry, supra note, at 48 (characterizing two "grand strategies" of realism 
and idealism as rooted in "divergent, even antagonistic, intellectual traditions"). 
74
Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 31, No. 2 [2004], Art. 2
https://surface.syr.edu/jilc/vol31/iss2/2
2004] Iraq and the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy 223 
public acceptance in the U.S. unless it credibly can be justified as 
necessary to protect American against concrete threats. Merely 
advancing idealist arguments risks public rejection and a retreat into 
isolation. The hard challenge for proponents of alternatives to the Bush 
Doctrine is to develop and present a foreign and national-security policy 
strategy that gains popularity both in the United States and abroad, 
especially among publics that otherwise may be drawn into supporting 
militant anti-Americanism and terrorism. 
E. A New Kind of Peace Corps for the Twenty-First Century can 
Reduce Genesis of terrorism and Can Project America's Inspiration 
This article argues that the essential core of American foreign 
policy is that it recognize the influence of public opinion in foreign 
states. Public diplomacy is an essential-one might say the most 
essential-tool in the American foreign policy arsenal. Effective public 
diplomacy requires a larger budget for public diplomacy institutions in 
the United States and an effective message transmitted by official U.S. 
sources. Diplomacy also requires thousands of individual ambassadors 
of goodwill presenting American role models and American points of 
view in foreign countries. Such outreach was part of the original 
justification for the Peace Corps. As important as a restructuring of 
U.S. military forces to increase their capability to engage in peace 
building and nationbuilding, is recognition that America needs another 
kind of foreign outreach. It is time to reinvent the Peace Corps. 
The United States needs a new mandate for a Peace Corps for the 
twenty-first century, to enlist young Americans to build civil society in 
countries in transition. This new organization should enlist disaffected 
youth from target countries. The logic supporting such an initiative is 
compelling. Small numbers of committed young people can make a 
difference in helping to build the institutions of a rule of law, civil 
society and market economies. 
A new mandate for the Peace Corps would focus on recruiting 
volunteers interested in building the institutions of a civil society. Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia and Egypt come to mind as early 
targets, but obviously dozens more exist. The new Peace Corps would 
be trained, not just to dig wells, teach in primary schools, and dispense 
medicines; it would be trained to develop the institutions of liberal 
democracy and of market economies. New Peace Corps volunteers 
would help build political parties and run political campaigns; they 
would be able to organize chambers of commerce, write business plans, 
support campaigns to attract foreign investment and nurture 
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development of e-commerce as a channel for small business 
entrepreneurship. 
The new Peace Corps could be shaped to facilitate cooperation and 
multilateralism. A regional approach might be useful, focusing efforts 
on "change agents," individuals (or maybe institutions or even 
countries) that others in the community and society look to and trust. 
Once ideas and institutions take root in a region, they look more 
"organic," and less threatening, to neighboring countries and peoples. 
The major elements of a new Peace Corps, distinguishing it from 
the present Peace Corps would be: 
• A focus on young professionals who are embarked on or 
who seek careers in foreign affairs or international business 
• Integration with any future requirement for a period of 
national service, as a part of, or an alternative to, a 
reinstated draft 
• Acceptance of foreign nationals into the new Peace Corps 
• Deployment of members to carry out concrete projects 
related to democracy development, economic development, 
and rule of law 
• Assignment of members to work alongside nationals of 
target countries as "coaches" 
The design of the new Peace Corps should draw upon the largely 
successful experience of the American Bar Association's Central 
European and Eurasian Law Initiative and on the ideas presented by 
Eliot Cohen for recruitment and training of a new cadre of professionals 
qualified for nation building and by USIP for a Rule of Law Reserves. 
Among other models is the White House Fellows program, in which 
promising young professionals are assigned to work for one year in 
White House Agencies and for federal cabinet officers. 
Despite President Bush's call for reinvigorated volunteerism in his 
2002 State of the Union message, the Administration has given almost 
no attention to embracing opportunities to make this a reality through 
recruitment of young people to work on nationbuilding in places that 
need it. The Administration is too busy managing its invasion of Iraq. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is not so much that the U.S. needs some new grand theory of 
international relations; it knows the theory: security, political and 
economic partnerships with other states are "critical components of an 
American-led world political order ... through which U.S. power is 
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leveraged and made more legitimate ... "254 The Bush Doctrine and the 
invasion of Iraq represent a failure to adapt received theories of 
international relations. The mishandling of the Iraq conflict, shaped by 
willful ignorance of lessons learned from other political trusteeships 
bespeaks indifference to the new realities of America's foreign affairs. 
The Iraq invasion and the Bush Doctrine undercut American legitimacy 
and its hard-earned reputations for moral leadership and effectiveness. 
The cultural war in American foreign policy is not a clash of 
competing theory; mainstream American foreign policy has never been 
purely realist or purely idealist; indeed, it would be surprising were it so 
because of the natural tendency of policy in a democratic society to 
borrow a bit from contending advocates so as to gain a measure of 
support from both. 255 It is a clash of competing pragmatic visions: a 
clash between those who want to avoid the messy realities of engaging 
complex political forces in a changing world and those who are willing 
to provide leadership to shape the direction in which those forces are 
applied. 
254. Ikenberry, supra note 163, at 48. 
255. Id. at 60 (noting realist orientation of containment and deterrence, and idealist 
orientation of open trade, democracy and "institutionalized relations" among states). See id. 
at 48 (characterizing two "grand strategies" of realism and idealism as rooted in "divergent, 
even antagonistic, intellectual traditions"). 
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